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ABSTRACT 
 
In the broadest sense, the three essays that make up this dissertation address certain 
normative features in John Locke’s philosophy: “On Revolution: Arendt, Locke, and 
Republican Revisionism” deals with Hannah Arendt’s early republican revisionism that 
removes Locke’s influence from the American revolutionary period. Her (mistaken) 
belief is that Locke’s political philosophy encourages social disengagement and political 
apathy. In “One Body of People: Locke on Amerindians, Protestant Evangelism, and the 
Colonization of North America” I take seriously Locke’s religious devotion and reassess 
his colonial philosophy through an “evangelical” lens. It turns out his colonial thought 
was not motivated by “punishment” but by a perceived collective good.  In “Friends in 
the State of Nature: John Locke and the Formation of Security Communities,” I explore 
the routinely overlooked fact that Locke characterizes humans as highly sociable and 
prone to friendship. To be sure, friendship and trust not only exist in the state of nature, 
they are what precipitate the contractual movement into civil society. This is particularly 
relevant given the fact that the realist tradition within international relations almost 
reflexively characterizes the relationship between states as one of ruthless self-interest. 
v 
 
The way Locke speaks about the formation of political communities is highly reminiscent 
of “security communities,” a term popularized by Karl Deustch in the late 1950s, which 
describes groups of people who have integrated to such an extent that conflict can be 
managed in nonviolent ways. Locke characterizes the international community both in 
terms of moral communities (where different regions of the world share different values), 
and also in terms of economic communities of varying degrees of interdependence. 
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On Revolution: Arendt, Locke, and Republican Revisionism1 
 
1963 was a remarkable year for Hannah Arendt. In the early months of that year, 
her much-maligned (if not misunderstood) reportage of the Adolf Eichmann trial was 
published, setting off an intellectual firestorm that has persisted for the last five decades. 
Later that same year, Arendt published another remarkable little book called On 
Revolution. Perhaps one the most general topics this book seeks to address is why our 
contemporary understanding of “revolution” takes its bearings from the “failed” French 
Revolution rather than from the “successful” American Revolution. After all, many 
Americans—indeed, even some American political scientists—do not think of the 
American Revolution as an authentic revolution in the same way the French or Russian 
revolutions are.2 This crude success-fail binary, however, turns out to be not quite right 
either; Arendt goes on to show that both revolutions really failed in their own respective 
ways—the American Revolution suffered certain sins of omission, while the French 
Revolution suffered from perhaps more grievous sins of commission. 
 The American Revolution, Arendt argues, originated as an attempt to restore 
ancient rights and liberties that tyranny had dispossessed them of (and in this sense 
revolution bore a much closer resemblance to its original astrological etymological 
root—the revolutions of planets). It was the failure to restore these rights which put the 
founders in the uncomfortable position of needing to declare independence (with all the 
Burkean anxiety this seemed to bring with it). The fervor of constitution-making that 
                                                 
1An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 2014 MPSA conference. I would like to thank Judith 
Swanson, James Schmidt, James Sven Josefson, and the anonymous reviewers for the History of 
Political Thought Journal for their compelling and thoughtful recommendations. All errors are mine. 
2See for instance, Theda Skocpol's State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia, and China (New York, 1979). 
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corresponded with the declaration of independence, Arendt argues, was not concerned 
with civil rights. Such rights were perhaps implicit to or subsumed by the proto-
republican practices that were already present in the numerous political societies that the 
country had known since colonization. At that time, constitution-making was more 
concerned with the project of building an effective system of checks and balances, what 
was seen as a necessary apparatus of republican government. The idea here is that early 
Americans weren't theorizing about republican liberty, they were practicing it. As such, a 
great deal of the institutional focus was on how to preserve what they already had. The 
institutions that were eventually agreed upon and established, however, overshot the 
republican sentiment that underwrote them. In effect, the US Constitution cheated the 
American people out of its revolutionary spirit because it failed to institutionalize and 
preserve the original sources of power and public happiness that gave rise to the 
revolutionary sentiment to begin with—the more or less direct participation in the 
practice of government through townships and town hall meetings.3 Only Jefferson with 
his ward-republics took this problem seriously. This is to say that the technical aspects of 
constructing a balanced political system led to a kind of representational government 
which, ironically, excludes people from the public realm; citizens are only “public 
participators” on election day. This led Jefferson to lament that—Arendt quotes—“people 
must either sink into 'lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty,' or 'preserve 
the spirit of resistance' to whatever government they have elected, since the only power 
                                                 
3Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York, 1990). p. 239. 
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they retained is 'the reserve power of revolution'”4—bemoaning what appears to be a 
crude portrayal of Lockean civil society. So while ostensibly successful, Arendt argues 
that the American founders failed to institutionalize the practice of republicanism that 
was discovered (but not adequately theorized) by the original colonists of the 17th century 
and which fueled the revolutionary spirit in the 18th century. The representative system 
that was originally animated by republican principles of “public freedom, public 
happiness, and public spirit” gave way to the liberal language of “civil liberties, the 
individual welfare of the greatest number, and public opinion.”5 Since, as it will be shown 
below, Arendt characterizes Locke as championing a passively acquiescent brand of 
social contracting, it remains unclear if, given the failure of American republicanism to 
take hold, Arendt's Locke had too much or too little influence. Indeed, part of what this 
paper attempts to uncover is that there might be greater continuity between the civic 
humanism Arendt advocated and the “positive engagement” Locke believes underwrites 
membership in civil society—i.e. that if republicanism failed in the US it was in spite of, 
not because of, Locke's influence. 
 In stark contrast to the American experience, the French Revolution was a 
disastrous result of locating rights outside of political tradition and the political order, 
generally speaking. The emergence of natural rights and natural law engendered what 
amounted to the “historical necessity” of revolution. Quite contrary to the American 
Revolution, the French Revolution was animated by the rights of man in the face of the 
“spectacle of misery.” This is what Arendt argues characterizes the dominant view of 
                                                 
4Ibid., p. 238 
5Ibid., p. 221. 
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revolution today—the use of revolutionary violence in the 20th century can all be 
described in terms of historical necessity—take, for instance, the Marxist's “law of 
history,” and, though not a revolution, the same logic applies to the Nazi's “law of 
nature.” Authority is not generated by intersubjective agreement but “found” and 
appealed to, as it is located outside of the political arena. 
 This is a very general overview of Arendt's project. What I find so striking about 
this analysis is that even granting the formative republican sensibilities of the American 
founders, it seems that some discussion of Locke would be relevant in order to make 
sense of the logic of the American Revolution. Not only was he an early theorist of 
legitimate “rebellion,” but the first American edition of the Second Treatise was 
published by Boston revolutionary printers, Edes & Gill, in 1773—a year perhaps too 
coincidental to be neglected (this was the year the Tea Act was implemented, which 
signaled increasing tension between the colonists and Britain). But given Arendt's schema 
of the French and American revolutionary traditions, it is not quite clear where—if 
anywhere—Locke fits in to this discussion. I think it bears mentioning what a remarkable 
challenge this was to the thought of her day; indeed a quick survey of Arendt's 
bibliography for On Revolution shows that she must have been well acquainted with the 
“classical” view of Locke's ascendant role in the struggle for American independence—
that he was, as many believed, “America's philosopher”6—not to mention his importance 
to Thomas Jefferson's political thought in particular. After all, Locke (along with Newton 
and Bacon) was a member of Jefferson's “trinity of the three greatest men the world had 
                                                 
6Merle Curti, “The Great Mr. Locke: America's Philosopher, 1783-1861,” The Huntington Library Bulletin 
No. 11. (1937). pp. 107-151. 
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ever produced.”7 
 This classical interpretation of Locke's importance runs throughout Arendt's 
sources: In his 1922 The Declaration of Independence, Carl L. Becker wrote, “Most 
Americans had absorbed Locke's work as a kind of political gospel; the Declaration, in its 
form, in its phraseology, follows closely certain sentences in Locke's second treatise on 
government.”8 Another book of that year, Claude van Tyne's The Founding of the 
American Republic, says “we find in the debate in Parliament in the ten years preceding 
the Revolution, nearly as much use of Locke's philosophy as in America.”9 In 1927, 
Verron L. Parrington wrote that “Locke's two Treatises on Civil Government … were 
turned against Parliament and became the textbook of the American Revolution.”10 And 
finally, in 1959, John C. Miller wrote that “above all, the political writings of John Locke 
furnished Americans … with an arsenal of arguments against arbitrary rule of both King 
and Parliament. If any one man can be said to have dominated the political philosophy of 
the American revolution, it is John Locke. American political thinking was largely an 
exegesis upon Locke.”11 
 This is just a small sample of the classical view that pervades the intellectual and 
historical accounts of the American Revolution that Arendt was reading. And yet, she 
conspicuously marginalizes Locke's influence without discussion or comment. She 
                                                 
7Thomas Jefferson, The Works of Thomas Jefferson Vol. XI: Correspondence and Papers 1808-1816 ed. 
Paul Leicester Ford (New York, 2009). p. 168. 
8Carl L. Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (New York, 
1922). p. 27. 
9Claude van Tyne, The Founding of the American Republic: The Causes of the War of Independence 
(Boston, 1922). p. 228. 
10Verron L. Perrington, The Main Currents in American Thought: Volume 1, The Colonial  Mind 
(New York, 1927). p. 189. 
11John C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution (Stanford, 1959). p. 170. 
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writes, “it rather looks as though [Locke] was more influenced by the facts and events in 
America, and perhaps in a more decisive manner, than the founders were influenced by 
his Treatises of Civil Government.”12 And elsewhere: “it may be well to turn our attention 
once more to the public spirit which … antedated the revolutions and bore its first 
theoretical fruition in James Harrington and Montesquieu rather than in Locke and 
Rousseau.”13 And in another more oblique reference she writes, “the Declaration of 
Independence … owes nothing to its natural law philosophy in which case it would 
indeed be 'lacking in depth and subtlety.'”14 The only conclusion one can draw from her 
references to Locke is that he was at best a marginal thinker to the founders or, at worst, a 
liability to the republicanism they practiced.15 
 When On Revolution was first published, the conventional view that saw the 
Locke-inspired Declaration of Independence as espousing liberal, rights-based principles 
was very much still ascendant. Robert Shalhope and Barbara Arneil see the beginning of 
the attack on Locke and the liberal tradition taking place in the 1950s, in the works of 
Clinton Rossiter (Seedtime of the Republic) and Caroline Robbins (The Eighteenth-
Century Commonwealthman).16 But at that time, Arneil suggests, historians were mostly 
                                                 
12Arendt, On Revolution, p. 169. 
13Ibid., p. 224. 
14Ibid., p. 129. 
15In a much later essay, “Civil Disobedience,” Arendt appears to soften her reading of Locke. She approves 
of Locke's understanding of the formation of “society.” She argues that the founders had Locke in mind 
when they spoke of “mutual promises.” She writes, “when the signers of the Declaration of 
Independence 'mutually pledged' their lives their fortunes, and their sacred honor, they were thinking in 
this vein of specifically American experiences as well as in terms of generalization and 
conceptualization by Locke” (Hannah Arendt, “Civil Disobedience,” in Crises of the Republic [New 
York, 1972] p. 87). It is not clear to me that this represents a shift in her thinking about Locke. After all, 
this does not overcome her fundamental critique of the social contract tradition that will be explored 
later. 
16Robert E. Shalhope, “Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of 
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interested in exploring alternative political traditions the American founders were 
drawing on, not the outright exclusion of Locke that would crystallize in the 1970s, in 
such works as J. G. A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment (1975) and Garry Wills' 
Inventing America (1978).17 Arneil also points to John Dunn's 1969 article “The Politics 
of John Locke in England and America in the 18th Century,” “which claimed that Locke's 
Two Treatises were virtually unknown in America for the first half of the eighteenth 
century, while Locke's political theory, far from being the revolutionary liberal treatise 
needed by the signators of the Constitution, was very conservative indeed.”18 In 1982, 
Isaac Kramnick suggested that Lockean revisionism began with the publication of 
Stanley Katz's 1969 essay “The Origins of American Constitutional Thought.”19 In this 
article Katz writes: 
Locke et praetera nihil, it now appears, will no longer do as a motto for the study 
of eighteenth century Anglo-American political thought. The state of nature, 
doctrine of consent, and theory of natural rights were not as important before 
1776 as the ideas of mixed government, separation of powers and a balanced 
constitution. We are only in the opening phases of a major reassessment of our 
constitutional heritage.20 
 
Lance Banning sees this shift beginning with Bernard Bailyn's The Ideological Origins of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Republicanism in American Historiography,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 29:1, (1972). pp. 49-80, 
and Barbara Arneil, John Locke and America: The Defense of English Colonialism (Oxford, 1996). See 
also Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American Tradition of Political 
Liberty (New York, 1953), and Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman: Studies 
in the Transmission, Development, and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration 
of Charles II Until the War with the Thirteen Colonies (Cambridge, MA, 1959). 
17See John G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (New Jersey, 1975), and Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration 
of Independence (New York, 1978). 
18Arneil, John Locke and America, p. 12. See John Dunn, “The Politics of Locke in England and America 
in the Eighteenth Century,” in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives: A Collection of Essays, ed. John 
W. Yolton, (New York, 1969). 
19Isaac Kramnick, “Republican Revisionism Revisited,” The American Historical Review  87:3 (1982). pp. 
629-664. p. 630. 
20Stanley Katz, “The Origins of American Constitutional Thought,” in Perspectives in American History, 3 
(1969) pp. 474-490. p. 474. 
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the American Revolution (1967) and Gordon Wood's The Creation of the American 
Republic, 1776-1787 (1969).21 These two authors embody what Donald Lutz calls the 
“republican synthesis,” which is the view that “the radical English Whigs generated the 
perspective that brought order and synthesis to the other strands of writing [i.e. 
Enlightenment rationalism and English common law], and more than any other source 
'shaped the mind of the American Revolutionary generation.'”22 
 At least two things stand out from this quick survey of scholarship on the 
ideological origins of the America Revolution: first, the tenor of Arendt's work clearly 
situates her as an early republican revisionist. Her anti-Lockean, republican-oriented 
critique comes several years before most of the conventional revisionists. And secondly, a 
review of the revisionist literature shows that very few subsequent republican revisionists 
were drawing on Arendt's work. Despite its early appearance and clear relevance, On 
Revolution features marginally in this tradition (with the exception of Pocock who cites 
both The Human Condition and On Revolution as influential to his thought23). In light of 
these facts, two additional questions emerge: first, given the novelty of her approach, 
what explains Arendt's reading of Locke? And secondly, is Arendt's reading of Locke 
justified? 
 Of the early revisionists, we know that Arendt was familiar with Rossiter's work. 
She cites both The First American Revolution and “The Legacy of John Adams,” but it is 
not clear to what degree she was aware of the emergence of this debate or shift in 
                                                 
21Lance Banning, “Jefferson Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American 
Republic,” The William and Mary Quarterly 43:1 (1986). pp. 3-19. p. 3. 
22Donald S. Lutz, “The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American 
Political Thought,” The American Political Science Review 78:1 (1984). pp. 189-197. p. 189. 
23Pocock, The Machiavelli Moment, pp. 516, 550. 
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academic thought. She was acquainted with Gilbert Chinard's work, who, in the 
“Introduction” to his Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson, attempts to minimize the 
influence of Locke on Jefferson. He writes, “Locke, Jefferson knew and studied 
separately, as can be seen from the extracts published here in the appendix, but it is very 
doubtful whether he was greatly influenced by him.”24 So while there was clearly 
precedent for anti-Lockean sentiment at the time On Revolution was published, it had not 
yet evolved into the republican readings that would characterize the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Arendt was clearly an early proponent of the “republican hypothesis.”25 
 The republican hypothesis can be summarized this way: 
The republican revisionist reading has replaced Lockean liberalism with civic 
humanism. Part Aristotle, part Cicero, part Machiavelli, civic humanism 
conceives of man as a political being whose realization of self occurs only 
through participation in public life, through active citizenship in a republic. The 
virtuous man is concerned primarily with the public good, res publica, or 
commonweal, not with private or selfish ends.”26 
 
This reading can be seen in various places in Arendt's work. For instance, she writes: 
If Jefferson was right and it was in quest of 'public happiness' that the 'free 
inhabitants of  the British dominions' had emigrated to America, then the colonies 
in the New World must have been the breeding ground for revolutionaries from 
the beginning. And, by the same token, they must have been prompted even then 
by some sort of dissatisfaction with the rights and liberties of Englishmen, 
prompted by a desire for some kind of freedom which the 'free inhabitants' of the 
mother country did not enjoy. This freedom they called later, when they had come 
to taste it, 'public happiness,' and it consisted in the citizen's right of access to the 
public realm, in his share in public power—to be a 'participator in  the 
government of affairs' in Jefferson's telling phrase—as distinct from the generally 
recognized rights of  subjects to be protected by the government in the pursuit of 
private happiness even against public power, that is, distinct from the rights which 
only tyrannical power would abolish. The very fact that the word 'happiness' was 
                                                 
24Gilbert Chinard, “Introduction,” The Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson: A Repertory of His Ideas 
on Government (Baltimore, MD, 1926). p. 54. 
25Banning, “Jefferson Ideology Revisited,” p. 3. 
26Kramnick, “Republican Revisionism Revisited,” p. 630. 
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chosen in laying claim to a share in public power indicates strongly that there 
existed in the country, prior to the revolution, such a thing as 'public happiness,' 
and that men know they could not be altogether 'happy' if their happiness was 
located and enjoyed only in private life.27  
 
For Arendt, the fact that public happiness was implicated but not explicitly distinguished 
in Jefferson's “pursuit of happiness” speaks to a kind of conceptual ambiguity that she 
finds problematic. She claims that “Jefferson himself was not very sure in his own mind 
which kind of happiness he meant when he made its pursuit one of the inalienable rights 
of man.”28 She chalks this imprecision up to his “felicity of pen.”29 And later, when 
Arendt quotes Jefferson as saying that happiness lies outside the public realm “in the lap 
and love of my family, in the society of my neighbors and my books, in wholesome 
occupation of my farms and affairs,” which suggests that happiness might be found “in 
the privacy of a home upon whose life the public has no claim,” she dismisses this as “not 
carrying much weight.”30 
 Elsewhere Arendt seeks to uncover the real meaning behind the rights-based 
idiom of the founding fathers. She writes: 
Since the original intention had not been the foundation of freedom but the 
recovery of the rights and liberties of limited government, it was only natural that 
the men of the revolution themselves, when finally confronted by the ultimate 
task of revolutionary government, the foundation of the republic, should be 
tempted to speak of the new freedom, born in the course of the revolution, in 
terms of ancient liberties.31 
 
What Arendt is pointing to is the tension between the self-professed restoration of rights 
and the foundation of a new government, which the founders believed must be based on 
                                                 
27Arendt, On Revolution, p. 127. 
28Ibid., p. 127. 
29Ibid. 
30Ibid., pp. 128-29.   
31Ibid., pp. 154-55. 
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the proper distribution and balance of power. The difference between these two positions 
can be seen in the distinction Arendt makes between the respective bases for the 
American and French understanding as to what guarantees civil liberties. The Americans, 
in saying that the “rights which up to now had been enjoyed by Englishmen should be 
enjoyed in the future by all men,” simply meant that “all men should live under 
constitutional, 'limited' government.'”32 For Arendt, rights are best understood as 
guaranteed within the context of constitutional governments.33 In contrast, being 
animated by necessity and the deprivation of the poor, the French Revolutionaries 
“[proclaimed] the existence of rights independent of and outside the body politic”34; 
namely, human rights. Human rights stem from the same wellspring of necessity that 
doomed the French Revolution and all subsequent revolutions of this tradition. Arendt 
writes, “The trouble with these rights has always been that they could not but be less than 
the rights of nationals, and that they were invoked only as a last resort by those who had 
lost their normal rights as citizens.”35 The failure of the French Revolution to produce a 
lasting republican constitution may, in part, be attributed to the fact that pre-political 
rights served as a relatively weak guarantee for civil liberties. Indeed, much of the self-
immolation of the First Republic likely found its origin in the contradictory “necessity” 
                                                 
32Ibid., pp. 148-49. 
33There is much that could be said about this. For instance, in the Origins of Totalitarianism she writes, 
“The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke 
down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted 
with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships—except that they were 
still human [i.e. Jewish refugees of World War II]. The world found nothing sacred in the abstract 
nakedness of being human. And in view of objective political conditions, it is hard to say how the 
concepts of man upon which human rights are based […] could have helped to find a solution to the 
problem.” Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1973), p. 299. 
34Arendt, On Revolution, p. 149. 
35Ibid. 
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of purging those who posed a threat to these rights—engaging in the ad hoc task of 
violating some rights in order to preserve others. In any case, what Arendt neglects to 
point out in this rather rough distinction is that the appeal to pre-political rights can take 
many plausible, if not benign, expressions. For instance, Locke's rational-deliberative 
approach to natural rights would suggest a very different political form than that which 
results when such rights are unilaterally “discovered” and then given forceful political 
expression. 
 For Arendt, the founding fathers' rights rhetoric is best seen as a vestige of the 
project of restoration. She writes, “What they had thought was a restoration, the 
retrieving of their ancient liberties, turned into a revolution, and their thoughts and 
theories about the British constitution, the rights of Englishmen, and the forms of colonial 
government ended with a declaration of independence.”36 This is one clue that speaks to 
the relative absence of Locke's influence in Arendt's analysis; since she sees him as a 
philosopher of the restoration (which he wasn't—he was not looking to restore ancient 
rights, which were more like inequalities, i.e. the rights of lords, but to discover more 
basic natural rights that could give expression to the equality among men), Locke could 
not embody the new constitutionalism of the founders, which does not so much speak to 
the question of “civil rights … but of erecting a system of powers that would check and 
balance in such as way that the power of neither of the union of it parts, the duly 
constituted states, would decrease or destroy one another.”37 For this view, one would 
have to turn to thinkers, like Montesquieu, whose role in the American Revolution, 
                                                 
36Ibid., p. 44. 
37Ibid., p. 152. 
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Arendt explains,   
almost equals Rousseau's influence on the course of the French Revolution; for 
the main subject of Montesquieu's great work, studied and quoted as an authority 
on government at least a decade before the outbreak of the Revolution, was 
indeed 'the constitution of political freedom,' but the word 'constitution' in this 
context has lost all connotations of being a negative, a limitation and negation of 
power; the word means … that the 'grand temple of liberty' must be based on the 
foundation and correct distribution of power.38   
 
 With the emphasis of Montesquieu, Arendt is able to make a strong almost 
synonymic link between “power” and “liberty.” Public happiness—that is, having a share 
of public power—is contingent upon the proper delimiting and balancing of power. 
Arendt is arguing that the founders are acting within the republican tradition inasmuch as 
they are concerned with the balancing of power in the form of institutions that ensure 
each citizen is permitted to “pursue happiness” (or to abdicate this pursuit) in this very 
public sense. And in this regard, by focusing on such a practically-minded, institution-
based approach (i.e. political forms) to the founding of the republic, Arendt is compelled 
to excluded Locke's natural rights theorizing. She writes, “It has been said that 'America's 
debt to the idea of the social contract is so huge as to defy measurement,' but the point of 
the matter is that the early colonists, not the men of the Revolution, 'put the idea into 
practice,' and they certainly had no notion of any theory.”39 It is as though Arendt had 
Benjamin Rush's formulation from Observations Upon the Present Government of 
Pennsylvania in mind—“Mr. Locke is an oracle as to the principles, Harrington and 
Montesquieu are the oracles as to the forms of government”40—when she wrote that the 
                                                 
38Ibid., p. 150. 
39Ibid., p. 169. 
40Benjamin Rush, Observations Upon the Present Government of Pennsylvania: In Four Letters to the 
People of Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania, 1777). p. 20. 
  14   
 
“public spirit which … antedated the revolutions and bore its first theoretical fruition” 
was that of “James Harrington and Montesquieu rather than in Locke and Rousseau.”41 
Since, according to Arendt, the founders were guided by their experiences and were in no 
need of “principles” but instead only “forms,” Locke could have played no substantial 
role in the founding. 
 Emphasizing the role Montesquieu played in the founding of America is, of 
course, selective. It fails to take into consideration, for instance, Jefferson's profound 
distrust of the Spirit of the Laws. He explains that it “contains indeed a great number of 
political truths; but also an equal number of heresies; so that the reader must constantly 
be on his guard.”42; and later, “I had, with the world, deemed Montesquieu's work of 
much merit; but saw in it, with every thinking man, so much of paradox, of false 
principle and misapplied fact, as to render its value equivocal on the whole.”43 Likewise 
it would be equally uncharitable to dismiss Locke's influence on Jefferson (and on the 
founders, generally) for similarly equivocal remarks. Arendt picks up on some of these; 
she reminds us that in spite of the Lockean overtones, the Declaration of Independence 
was, in Jefferson's words, “Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet 
copied from any particular and previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of 
the American mind, and to give that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the 
occasion.”44 Some in the revisionist tradition point to passages like this as the kind of 
smoking gun that represents Jefferson's clear break with Lockean thought. This, of 
                                                 
41Arendt, On Revolution, p. 224. 
42Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson: Political Writings eds. Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball (New York, 1999). 
p. 261. 
43Jefferson, The Works, p. 181. 
44Qtd. Arendt, On Revolution, p. 130. 
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course, assumes—and this is one of the weaknesses of Lutz's famous essay that counts 
citations in the decades around the revolution in order to determine which writers 
influenced the founders the most—that direct citation and attribution are the clearest 
signs and most authentic representations of influence. Jefferson may, in fact, be paying a 
much higher tribute to Locke, that his work need not be cited because it represents a clear 
“expression of the American mind.” The fact that Jefferson was compelled to defend the 
Declaration in this way perhaps best proves the point; enough people thought he had 
copied Locke that he needed to defend his authorship. 
 Getting back to the foundational “experience” of the colonists, Arendt is pointing 
to a kind of proto-republicanism the early Americans discovered rather than imitated or 
even really theorized about. She writes, “Once we turn from these [social contract] 
theories and speculations about influences to the documents themselves and their simple 
uncluttered, and often awkward language, we see immediately that it is an event rather 
than a theory or a tradition we are confronted with, an event of the greatest 
magnitude...”45 What Arendt is speaking of is the sheer necessity of mutual promises and 
commitments made by the early colonists to each other in order to make life possible in 
the new world. She explains that 
From the weight and burden of [the traditions of the Old World] the settlers of the 
New World had escaped, not when they crossed the Atlantic but when, under the 
pressure of circumstances—in fear of the new continent's uncharted wilderness 
and frightened by the darkness of the human heart—they had constituted 
themselves into 'civil bodies politic,' mutually bound themselves into an enterprise 
for which no other bond existed, and thus made a new beginning in the very midst 
of the history of Western mankind.46 
                                                 
45Ibid., p. 172. 
46Ibid., p. 194. This would be a good place to look at the antiprimitivist threads that run through both 
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In their formative experiences, the colonists had already discovered power—that is, 
through the politically generative action of establishing “civil bodies politic” and 
“political societies”—and this power “was kept in existence by the then newly discovered 
means of promise and covenant.”47 So while the colonists and the American founders 
were certainly familiar with the terminology of the Enlightenment, Arendt believes this 
language is more properly seen as pasted over the essentially republican actions of the 
colonists' republic-building. This is why Arendt finds a great deal of conceptual 
ambiguity in Jefferson's thought when he “[speaks] of the consent of the people from 
which governments 'derive their just powers' in the same Declaration which he closes on 
the principle of mutual pledges, and neither he nor anybody else became aware of the 
simple and elementary difference between 'consent' and mutual promise, or between the 
two types of social-contract theory.”48 
 This, indeed, would speak to a kind of conceptual ambiguity if Arendt's 
understanding of the social contract tradition is right. She points to the 
innocent way in which Locke construed this 'original compact,' in line with the 
current social-contract theory, as a surrender of rights and powers to either the 
government or the community, that is, not at all as a 'mutual' contract but as an 
                                                                                                                                                 
Locke's and Arendt's work. While I do not have the space here to fully adumbrate the literature on this 
subject, I suggest looking at Richard Tuck's The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and 
International Order from Grotius to Kant (New York, 1999), and Barbara Arneil's John Locke and 
America: The Defense of English Colonialism, cited above; these two book deeply complicate Locke's 
intellectual legacy with regard to the New World. More relevant to this quote is Jimmy Casas Klausen's 
essay “Hannah Arendt's Anti-Primitivism,” [Political Theory 38:3, 2010, 394-423] where he explores 
the problematic way in which Arendt compares the dehumanization of “civilized” peoples to savages. 
Arendt's conception of politics and culture may be predicated on a characterization of humanity that is 
antiprimitivist in nature. My sense is that Arendt believed the colonial experience to be a promising 
example of republican politics but that she failed to adequately theorize about the “civilized”-“savage” 
tension that is implicit to her analysis. 
47Ibid., p. 176. 
48Ibid., pp. 176-77. 
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agreement in which an individual person resigns his power to some higher 
authority and consents to be ruled in exchange for a reasonable protection of his 
life and property.49 
  
In other words, the inherent passivity of Locke's consent—what, above, Jefferson 
identified as a kind of political lethargy—appears to contradict the perpetually active 
process of making mutual promises.50 This is to say, if one alienates all or most of one's 
political power, what is the point of continuing to make mutual pledges? She goes on to 
explain this fundamental contradiction at the heart of social contract theory: “we must 
recall that in theory the seventeenth century clearly distinguished between two kinds of 
'social contact.' One was conducted between individual persons and supposedly gave 
birth to society; the other was concluded between a people and its ruler and supposedly 
resulted in legitimate government.”51 This “second type” of social contract was not only 
problematic for its passivity, but also for its fictiveness. She goes on to explain that 
the mutual contract by which people bind themselves together in order to form 
community is based on reciprocity and presupposes equality; its actual content is 
a promise, and its result is indeed a 'society' or 'cosociation' in the old Roman 
sense of societas, which means alliance … In the so-called social contact between 
a given society and its ruler, on the other hand, we deal with a fictitious, 
aboriginal act on the side of each member, by virtue of which he gives up his 
isolated strength and power to constitute a government; far from gaining a new 
power, and possibly more than he had before, he resigns his power such as it is, 
and far from binding himself through promises, he merely expresses his 'consent' 
to be ruled by the government, whose power consists of the sum total of forces 
which are monopolized by the government for the alleged benefit of all subjects.52 
                                                 
49Ibid., p. 169. 
50This is an idea that Arendt conveyed much earlier in a lecture on Locke she gave at Berkeley, in 1955: 
“For Locke, Society is what always remains and government is there to protect this Society, not to 
protect each against the other,/ All have in common [Hobbes, Locke, and Spinoza]; Government means 
the abandonment of political power, the capacity to act in order to be free for something else.” Hannah 
Arendt, “History of Political Theory: John Locke,” (1955), Digitized Arendt Papers at the Library of 
Congress, Series: Subject File, 1949-1975, n.d., 024099. 
51Arendt, On Revolution, p. 169. 
52Ibid., p. 170. 
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It remains to be seen, however, that this reading of Locke is justified. 
 There are several facts that Arendt’s reading of Locke fails to consider. First, and 
perhaps most obviously, for Locke there was only ever one kind of social contract, not 
two. The only contracting he speaks of is that of social incorporation where individuals 
are bound together in one society—i.e. the mutual pledges that Arendt speaks of. It 
should be pointed out that Locke conspicuously avoids calling the relationship between 
the body politic and its political representatives a “contract” or “compact.” For the 
establishing of government he reserves the language of “delegated power,” “voluntary 
grant,” (§141) and “fiduciary trust” (§156). For Locke, the people authorize the 
establishment of a sovereign; they don't contract with that authority. Using the language 
of contract would imply that the contracted parties are equally bound, when Locke is 
clearly attempting to convey an imbalance—the people at all times remain engaged with 
and oversee a very precious “investment,” that of the political authority they have 
conferred onto their representatives. 
  The very point of this distinction is likely to avoid the passivity that Arendt is 
concerned with. Having entrusted certain powers to political representatives, the citizenry 
must always remain “vigilant observers of government”53; Locke explains, “the common 
question will be made, Who shall be judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary 
to their trust? … To this I reply, The people shall be judge; for who shall be judge 
whether his trustee or deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, be he 
who deputed him” (§240). This passage does a great deal to show that the citizenry are 
                                                 
53Nathan Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty (Landam, MD, 1999). p. 5. 
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not passive receptacles of “liberty,” receiving certain protections at the cost of true 
freedom and happiness, but that the conferral of authority remains authentic only in the 
context of an engaged and judging public. After all, it is ideally an informed majority, for 
Locke, that must decide if resistance to the abuse of power is in order; it is the public, that 
must differentiate between “mistakes” and “mismanagement” and a “long train of abuses, 
prevarications and artifices” that signal the rise of tyranny (§225).  It is perhaps with this 
Lockean sentiment in mind that Jefferson, late in life, famously wrote, “Time indeed 
changes manners and notions, and so far we must expect institutions to bend to them. But 
time produces also corruption of principles, and against this it is the duty of good citizens 
to be ever on the watch, and if the gangrene is to prevail at last, let the day be kept off as 
long as possible … Let the eye of vigilance never be closed.”54 
  Locke goes on to argue that “submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly 
and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that 
society … Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive 
engagement, and express promise and compact” (§122). What this seems to suggest is 
that vigilance against tyrannical rule could only ever be a partial or minimal requirement 
of those who enter into civil society. It seems that what Locke had in mind in terms of 
civic responsibility is an even greater level of engagement that he never fully theorized 
about, what he calls “positive engagement.”55 In any case, I think it is clear that Locke is 
                                                 
54Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to Judge Roane, March 9, 1821,” in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Volume 
VII ed. Henry August Washington (New York, 1859). pp. 211-12. 
55This formulation obviously sits in tension with Locke's view of tacit consent (Second Treatise, §§119-
122). It seems clear, however, that Locke has two conceptions of citizenship: perfect and imperfect. The 
individual who “tacitly consents” to a government by virtue of passively living within its jurisdiction 
can legitimately be held accountable for breaking the law; this is an imperfect form of citizenship that is 
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not advocating the kind of political resignation that Arendt believes characterizes the 
second type of social contracting. Rather than embodying an atomistic egoism, for Locke 
civic engagement is a cooperative and perpetually active process, at least much more 
collective than Arendt gives him credit for. Indeed, in this regard, Locke's thought might 
bear closer resemblance to Arendt's view of action in the public realm that initially 
expected.56 
 The second major problem with Arendt's interpretation is that Locke does not 
think the social contact between a given society and its ruler is altogether an aboriginal 
fiction. While Locke does spend a great deal of time addressing the problems with 
Filmer's view of patriarchal authority, his characterization of the delegation of power to 
representatives is more prescriptive than descriptive. This can in part be seen by the fact 
that quite early in the Second Treatise he says that man “cannot by compact, or his own 
consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power 
of another, to take away his life, when he pleases” (§23). The twofold work of this claim, 
I think, is suggestive of just how aspirational his thinking is. What I mean is, not only is 
Locke invalidating many of the regimes throughout antiquity (rendering them invalid 
inasmuch as they do not show evidence of authentic consent), but that he is equipping 
citizens to judge whether or not the government that represents them is legitimate. That 
                                                                                                                                                 
a kind of expedient to fill a conceptual gap in Locke's formulation of civil society—what if large swaths 
of the local population benefit from the protection of civil society but don't explicitly consent to it? 
Locke, however, argues that in order to become a genuine or “perfect” citizen one must expressly 
consent and publicly engage. This is likely due to Locke's conception of freedom that cannot be fully 
explored here. While not the perfect freedom of the state of nature, freedom in civil society is given 
expression through active, public engagement. 
56I am simply arguing for greater compatibility not a perfect match. There is plenty of room for 
disagreement between Arendt and Locke on the particulars about what the active political life entails. 
Here I am thinking of Arendt's criticism of Locke's “society of property owners.” See Hannah Arendt, 
The Human Condition (Chicago, 1958). p. 31. 
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is, it matters less how governments actually came into being throughout history and more 
whether a majority of the citizenry believes they are being tyrannized by the existing 
powers, as tyrannies can never be legitimate forms of government. To be sure, as both the 
source of political authority and the final judge as to authenticity and propriety of the 
existing rulers, the people must always remain engaged as the formative “supreme 
power” (§149). Once equipped with the conceptual tools to judge the actions of their 
governments, the body politic can dissolve the abusive regime and begin again. So even 
if the terms of the original trust were fictive (or perhaps simply forgotten), this was very 
likely due to a lack of vigilant oversight that Locke expects. Plus, Locke shows that, 
moving forward, the origins of political authority need not remain apocryphal, and 
neither does the citizenry need to fall back into the old ruts of accepting tyrannical rule. 
 Elsewhere, in a compelling turn, Arendt suggests that the American founders 
weren't Roman enough, that, in certain respects, they were more like Enlightenment 
liberals masquerading as republicans! She points to the paradoxical fact that men like 
Adams and Jefferson appealed to “a Supreme Being” and “the laws of nature and nature's 
God” at the very moment the enlightenment tradition was “about to liberate the secular 
realm fully from the influences of the churches and to separate politics and religion once 
and for all.”57 Arendt argues that Adams was in error to claim that “it was the general 
opinion of ancient nations that the Divinity alone was adequate to the important office of 
giving laws to men” because “neither the Greek nor the Roman concept of legislation 
                                                 
57Arendt, On Revolution, p. 186. 
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needed divine inspiration.”58 What Arendt is pointing to is that even enlightenment 
thinkers, like Locke, were “convinced that only an 'appeal to God in Heaven' could help 
those who came out of the 'state of nature' and were about to lay down the fundamental 
law of a civil society.”59 
 Arendt is getting this reading from section 20 of the Second Treatise. However, 
for Locke, the point of this section, and the one before it, is to distinguish between the 
state of nature and a state of war—that one could be in a state of war without regressing 
back into the state of nature. That is, in civil society, when one suffers violence “by hands 
appointed to administer justice,” the only remedy is “an appeal to heaven” (§20). In this 
section Locke is not speaking of appealing to a heavenly absolute to found laws of civil 
society (which doesn't mean that some heavenly appeal would be totally out of the 
question when speaking of such founding for Locke); here, however, Locke is simply 
saying that when a citizenry is tyrannized within civil society, by the very powers that are 
supposed to be the neutral judge and arbiter, they may have no other recourse than to 
make war against the government. An “appeal to heaven” was a seventeenth century 
euphemism for making war, which attempts to capture the variability, risk, and fortune of 
the battlefield.60 But it also shows that after political representatives have violated the 
fiduciary trust placed in them, there is, properly speaking, no earthly authority to arbitrate 
differences. All adjudicatory mechanisms have been left in abeyance, that is, beside the 
resort to force, which is subject to the uncertain and capricious will of God in heaven. 
                                                 
58Ibid., p. 186. 
59Ibid., p. 185. 
60Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development  of American 
Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York, 1991). p. 36. 
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 This misreading, or rather co-opting, of Locke's  “appeal to heaven” aside, the 
broader point Arendt is making is that it was the revolutionaries' appeal to the 
Enlightenment thinkers' notion of an absolute to underwrite and ground positive law in 
civil society that led to such disastrous results in France and to some, well, odd 
phraseology in the American founding documents. In particular she points to Jefferson's 
famous line: “We hold these truths to be self evident.” Arendt says that Jefferson should 
have written: “These truths are self-evident, namely, they possess a power to compel 
which is as irresistible as despotic power, they are not held by us but we are held by 
them; they stand in no need of agreement.”61 If one believed, as Locke did, that reason is 
the law of nature—that the two are in some sense coeval (see §6)—then one would 
expect the kind of rational-deliberative (intersubjective, consensus generating) approach 
to political truths as demonstrated by Jefferson and the founders. This is to say that it is 
not explicitly clear what it would mean for Locke that political authority and the civil law 
are grounded in the “absolute.”62   
 The first clue to this argument is that Locke believes that authority is not a 
naturally occurring phenomenon; it is discretionary in the sense that it is the product of 
agreement and the social contract. In terms of the positive law, he explains that the 
“constitution of the legislative [is] the original and supreme act of the society, antecedent 
to all positive laws in it, and depending wholly on the people, no inferior power can alter 
it” (§157), which seems to imply that “the people,” endowed with a rational faculty, play 
                                                 
61Arendt, On Revolution, p. 193. 
62Strauss speaks of the tension between Locke's rationalist and revelationist tendencies. See “Modern 
Natural Right” in Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1965). p. 209. 
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a crucial role in framing the state's foundational laws. By calling Locke's conception of 
authority and the formulation of positive laws “discretionary,” however, I do not mean to 
imply that they can be whatever the citizenry says they are. Laws are still determined by 
the “discovery” or “articulation” of natural law in some basic sense—individuals are 
“taught” and “obliged” by reason, which suggests that it represents a very real “non-
discretionary” constraint (see §6). The point here is that Locke is somewhat equivocal in 
how he represents the relationship between reason and natural law. In any case, for 
Locke, it is clear that political authority is not natural; rather, it is a tool to better manage 
the ever-accruing inconveniences stemming from life in the state of nature. Plus, a good 
deal of positive law simply reflects the contingencies of a political society, which would 
imply a great deal of variety in terms of how they might be expressed. The operative 
stipulation would be that positive law should not contradict natural law. 
 The point here isn't to say that Locke did not appeal to an absolute of any kind, 
but rather—to pick up on a neglected aspect of Arendt's own argument—it was because 
the American revolutionaries appealed to Locke rather than, say, Rousseau, that the 
absolute took on the relatively benign if not vestigial quality that it did. The fact that the 
American founders “held” rather than were “held by” certain truths perhaps speaks to the 
legacy of Locke's view of discretionary political authority and positive law, and that it 
was not merely the fact that, as Arendt argues, “cosociations” existed in America and not 
in France that led to the relative success and longevity of the American Revolution.63 
Indeed, Locke would have no trouble saying that since natural law is (more or less) 
                                                 
63Arendt, On Revolution, p. 181. 
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coeval with reason, as reasonable beings we should choose to regard all individuals as 
“equals” for the purposes of political society; hence we “hold” (i.e. choose to believe/say) 
such equality is “true.” The French revolutionaries, on the other hand, with their 
(mis)appropriation of Rousseau's “general will,” failed for the very reason that the appeal 
to the general will—if not properly guarded against—can lead to tyranny.64 Even though, 
for Rousseau, sovereign authority and positive law remain discretionary in a technical 
sense—the expression of the general will is relative to time, geography, and the country's 
ethnic composition—it also bears certain powerful non-discretionary qualities. For 
example, even though each member of society contributes to the general will, no one has 
unmediated access to it. This, of course, imbues the general will with deep epistemic 
uncertainty, which Rousseau himself seemed to be aware of. Once the body politic is 
constituted, the general will must be collectively “discovered” and enforced—which 
speaks to Rousseau's oft-cited view that citizens can be “forced to be free.”65 The French 
revolutionaries were able to justify their terror as virtue because they had “discovered” 
the most authentic political will of the French people, or so they thought. 
 Two final questions also seem to be at play here. First, is Lockean liberalism 
actually incompatible with (Arendtian) republicanism, or is this, as Jerome Huyler 
explains, “a conceptual quandary entirely of our own making?”66 And secondly, were the 
founders, like Jefferson, systematic and unified in their thinking in such a way that it is 
                                                 
64See Jacques Barzun, “Rousseau and Modern Tyranny,” in Classic Romantic, and Modern (Chicago, 
1975). 
65Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters, (New 
York, 1978 [1762]). p. 55. 
66Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, KS, 1995). p. 
224. 
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possible to clearly distinguish between republican and liberal tendencies? The gist of both 
of these questions, I think, exposes a conceptual flaw at work in thinkers who attempt to 
discern, in the case of Jefferson at least, the “order and system in his unsystematic 
observations.”67 I think Banning poses this problem quite well: “major difficulties will 
arise if we suppose that the analytical distinctions we detect were evident to those we 
study, or if we suggest that, in America, one of two separate and competing modes of 
thinking displaced the other in the years before 1815.”68 He goes on to say that 
“Logically, it may be inconsistent to be simultaneously liberal and classical. Historically, 
it was not.”69 And even if there was a fundamental logical incompatibility between 
liberalism and republicanism, it does not necessarily follow that there is an 
incompatibility between Locke and republicanism. Scholars like Jerome Huyler, for 
instance, have done a great deal (in his Locke in America) to show that Locke can be read 
as much more in step with Jeffersonian republicanism than otherwise thought. 
 This paper, however, does not look at the merits of republicanism (contra 
liberalism) or the historical influence of republicanism on early American thought; rather, 
this paper has simply attempted to uncover where one might find the origins of Arendt's 
marginalization of Locke's influence on the American founders and whether her reading 
of Locke is justified. Given the earliness of her work, I also find it strange that even 
though “Arendt's On Revolution was the first to challenge the tradition [which sees 
                                                 
67Joyce Appleby, “Introduction,” Jefferson: Political Writings eds. Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball (New 
York, 1999). p. xiii. 
68Banning, “Jefferson Ideology Revisited,” p. 12. 
69Ibid. 
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Jefferson as a Lockean liberal rather than a republican],”70 her work bore so little 
influence over the development of the republican synthesis. I can think of several factors 
that may speak to this: it is possible that On Revolution was a casualty of the firestorm 
that erupted around the publication of Eichmann In Jerusalem. Arendt's work might have 
been neglected as a result of her embattled, if undeserved, pariah status. Perhaps a 
disciplinary myopia is at work here, i.e. the work of a political theorist, even of Arendt's 
caliber, was simply off the radar of the historians—such as Bailyn and Wood—who were 
first writing on this subject. And lastly, despite these real professional hurdles, the neglect 
of On Revolution may also be due to the fact that while she anticipates key aspects of the 
revisionist movement, she remains outside of it due to the very nature of her thesis. What 
I mean is, it could be that she took Daniel Boorstin's argument about influences too much 
to heart71—the American founders were not influenced by republicanism as much as they 
discovered it, entirely independent of its intellectual tradition. Boorstin celebrates this; 
Arendt laments it, especially since, as she argues, the republicanism of the American 
founders failed to take hold. It seems that Arendt saw in the founders' republicanism a 
promising expression of her own radical civic humanism that has yet been realized. 
 Perhaps it is true that speaking of influences in a hard and fast way is too 
epistemically fraught to be useful, especially in reference to the founders' influences. To 
this point, Ronald Beiner offers a rather insightful observation as to how we might think 
                                                 
70Richard K. Matthews, The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson: A Revisionist View (Lawrence, KS, 
1984). p. 16. 
71See Daniel J. Boorstin in The Genius of American Public Life (Chicago, 1953). This is a book that Arendt 
cites. Essentially, Boorstin argues that the American founders did not appeal to “abstract philosophy” or 
to “theory” but were men of action; in other words, the founders' “political theory” amounted to 
institution-building (see Boorstin, 1953, pp. 3 & 9). 
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of the way the founders conceived of the authors they appealed to: 
The problem is that this prospect of absolute spontaneity, absolute beginning, is 
not exactly easy for men to face up to, nor is it something they can comfortably 
embrace. Thus we commonly find even the men of action drawing back from their 
own revolutionary initiatives, seeking out precedents or historical sanction to 
mitigate the unconditional novelty of their deeds.72 
 
This characterization is, in fact, more in tune with the “classical” view than might be 
initially expected. The historian Charles Wiltse, for instance, cautions against judging 
thinkers like Jefferson by the standards of “European theorists” because, “like most men 
of affairs, he was more inclined to find in the books of others justification for an already 
determined course of action than determination for future acts, and he was primarily 
influenced by books which tended in the direction of his own thinking.”73 If this is so, it 
would appear Arendt's instinct to look past the generally assumed preeminent influence 
of Locke on thinkers like Jefferson remains a compelling thesis. But even if we set the 
talk of influences aside, we might still want to leave a great deal of room for ideological 
affinity and convergence of thought—for instance, the way in which Jefferson believed 
Locke gave clear expression of the American mind. In this respect, it seems clear that 
there is a place for Locke in the American revolutionary tradition; and I can't help but 
wondering if Arendt's reading of Locke was a bit more judicious that she would have 
found greater resonance with him too. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72Ronald Beiner, “Interpretative Essay: Hannah Arendt on Judging” in Lectures on Kant's Political 
Philosophy (Chicago, 1989).  p. 118. 
73Charles M. Wiltse, The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy (New York, 1960). p. 48. 
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One Body of People: Locke on Amerindians, Protestant Evangelism, and the 
Colonization of North America 
 
There is a growing body of scholarship that attempts to locate Locke's “longstanding and 
independent interest in the colonizing projects” of North America within his political 
philosophy.74 This focus stems, in part, from certain key elements of Locke’s biography, 
in particular his relationship with Ashley Cooper, the First Earl of Shaftesbury. At 
Shaftesbury’s invitation, Locke served as the secretary for the Proprietors of Carolina 
(1668-75), and it was in this capacity that he became deeply immersed in colonial 
politics. Locke was, for instance, one of the contributing authors to The Fundamental 
Constitutions of Carolina (1669).75 It was in this period that Locke became personally 
invested in and profited from the slave trade. He owned shares in the Royal Africa 
Company (1671) and the Company of Merchant Adventures to Trade with the Bahamas 
(1672).76 We also know that Locke was professionally involved with the English Council 
for Trade and Foreign Plantations (1673-74), and then its successor agency, the Board of 
Trade (1696-1700). Both agencies were responsible for administering trade policy with 
the American colonies.77 
Locke’s involvement with these agencies was more than a passing bureaucratic 
interest. Tully argues that “Locke was one of the six or eight men who closely 
                                                 
74Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius 
to Kant (Oxford, 1999). 177. 
75 For a more complete discussion on the problems of Lockean authorship of The Fundamental 
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investigated and helped to shape the old colonial system during the Restoration.”78 And 
David Armitage explains that “By the time Locke resigned from the Board of Trade in 
June 1670 he had become one of the two best-informed observers of the English Atlantic 
world of the late seventeenth century.”79 These claims were corroborated by John 
Harrison's and Peter Laslett's analysis of Locke personal library; he had amassed one of 
the largest private collections of voyage and travel books in the seventeenth century.80 
Uncovering the particular administrative context in which Locke was writing has, 
in particular, led to several reformulations in our understanding of the Second Treatise. 
After all, Locke makes passing references to America and its native inhabitants numerous 
times in this essay.81 Such references give the impression that its content somehow moves 
beyond its explicit themes of property, political authority, and revolution.82 Many 
scholars now understand the treatise quite explicitly in light of Locke’s involvement in 
colonial politics. Barbara Arneil, for instance, sees it as an outright “defense of England's 
colonial policy in the new world.”83 This makes sense because, as we now know, the 
Americas were likely on Locke’s mind for one reason or another when he was writing the 
Second Treatise between 1679 and 1683.84 Armitage, for instance, convincingly shows 
that Locke was still deeply embroiled in Carolina politics in the early 1680s. He attended 
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a redrafting session of the Fundamental Constitutions in 1682.85 And in a similar vein, 
though perhaps less convincingly, Richard Tuck has found some evidence to suggest that 
the Second Treatise was written as part of a polemic against William Penn, who, after 
receiving the royal charter for what became Pennsylvania, in March 1681, essentially 
defected from the radical Whig position of exclusion. According to Tuck, Locke 
disagreed with Penn's humane and generous policies to the native inhabitants of the 
territory he took control of—namely, paying the native peoples for their land; 
“Pennsylvania” Tuck writes, “represented all the things which Locke was attacking in the 
Second Treatise.”86 
 With the turn to colonial readings of the Second Treatise, much of the scholarship 
assumes that punishment is central to Locke's thought. For instance, Nagamitsu Miura 
argues that “The ‘right of punishment’ in the state of nature that Locke speaks of puts in 
fact the militarily superior side in a dispute between the colonist and native people, 
namely the colonists, in a position of advantage, while it puts the militarily inferior ones, 
namely, native people, in a defenseless position.”87 This disparity of military capability 
allowed the colonists to paternalistically enforce the natural law, which native peoples 
were constantly at risk of violating. They could be punished and stripped of land rights 
due to their paganism, or their property claims could be vitiated because they were 
inefficient and wasteful in their use of land. In other words, Amerindians violated the 
natural law with regard to property since they were poor managers of the land. The first 
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argument can be traced back to early debates about native peoples’ humanity.88 The 
second argument goes back at least as far as Thomas More’s Utopia (1516). More writes, 
“[The Utopians] think it is quite just to wage war against someone who has land which he 
himself does not use, leaving it fallow and unproductive, but denying its possession and 
use to someone else who has a right, by the law of nature, to be maintained by it.”89 Mark 
Goldie argues that even though this argument was clearly much older than Locke, it was 
routinely attributed to him. He writes, “The case was put forward [by Locke] that native 
peoples, albeit having prior occupancy, must yield to the superior claims of settled 
agriculture.”90 Goldie goes on to show that thinkers subsequent to Locke sourced him for 
this view, e.g. John Buckley’s Inquiry into the Right of The Aboriginal Natives to the 
Land of America (1726) and Emer de Vattel’s Le drois des gens (1758).91  
  While I think Locke's conception of proper land use is crucial to the 
understanding of his colonial vision, it is less clear that this was a basis for mistreatment 
of natives, much less the forceful dispossession of the land they had cultivated. One 
might easily mistake this for Locke’s opinion due to the fact that his understanding of 
property is, at root, theological. As John Rawls points out: “Locke's underlying thought 
throughout [the Second Treatise] is that we belong to God as God's property; that our 
rights and duties derive from God's ownership of us.”92 And furthermore, “This deserves 
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emphasis because Locke is often discussed apart from this religious background … Yet 
for Locke and his contemporaries this religious background is fundamental, and to 
neglect it is to risk seriously misunderstanding their thought.”93 John Dunn makes a 
similar claim: “The duty of mankind, as God’s creatures, to obey their divine creator was 
the central axiom of John Locke’s thought. The entire framework of his thinking was 
‘theocentric’ and the key commitment of his intellectual life as a whole was the 
epistemological vindication of this framework.”94 In Locke’s era, theocentric arguments 
that emphasized punishment and dispossession were quite common. Given what we know 
of Locke’s religious devotion, however, it is odd that punishment is routinely emphasized 
to the exclusion of evangelism. After all, Locke quite explicitly speaks of “increasing the 
common stock of mankind,” which presumably includes the native peoples.95 Given the 
theocentric nature of Locke’s view of property and civil society, it is clear that he believes 
material and spiritual improvements are interconnected. The purpose of this paper, then, 
is to show that Locke was not an apologist for the ruthless dispossession of native 
peoples due to the fact that they had violated the natural law. Instead, Locke saw the 
colonial enclosure of “unused” land as an opportunity for what he believed was a 
collective good—namely, the eventual political and economic assimilation of the native 
peoples into proper political community. Locke believed that certain economic and 
political arrangements were necessary to generate the kinds of material conditions that 
make the Christian God, and his natural law, apparent.  
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The Punishment Thesis: 
 Part of the difficulty in uncovering the theological underpinning of Locke’s 
colonial thought stems from the fact that in the mid- to late-seventeenth century there 
were a variety of ways to theologically frame and even justify English colonial 
involvement in North America, especially as it pertained to the moral status of 
Amerindians. For instance, it is not clear, if, in the Second Treatise, as Arneil argues, 
Locke was “[distinguishing] himself from the colonial theories of, as he sees it, the 
trading Dutch and the marauding Spanish” by focusing on the origin of property, or if he 
is actually closer to the Christian moralist tradition, as espoused by Vitoria, which 
“argued that conquest over individuals who violated the law of nature was the basis of 
Spain's sovereignty in the new world.”96 
 The tension between these points of view can be traced back to what Locke 
almost self-consciously refers to as a “strange doctrine”—the idea that “in the state of 
nature everyone has the executive power of the law of nature” (§13). Locke had 
adumbrated this point a few sections earlier: 
In transgressing the law of nature the offender declares himself to live by another 
rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to 
the actions of men for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to 
mankind, the tie which is to secure them from injury and violence being slighted 
and broken by him. Which, being a trespass against the whole species, and the 
peace and safety of it provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this 
score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where 
it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on 
anyone who hath transgressed that law as may make him repent the doing of it, 
and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. 
And, in this case and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish the 
offender, and be executioner of the law of nature. (§8) 
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What is so striking about this passage is that even if one could agree with Tuck’s 
assertion that this proves “the natural private right to punish is central to [the Second 
Treatise],”97 it is not clear who the intended recipient of this punishment is that Locke has 
in mind. Some scholars, like James Tully, argue that “Locke’s strange doctrine, although 
it differs in some respects from the arguments of his predecessors, is a reassertion of this 
conventional justification of war.”98 In other words, “When a person violates the natural 
law they lose their natural rights and they must be enslaved or killed.”99 
 What stands out about Locke’s formulation, however, is that the natural right to 
punish is a strange doctrine (which Tully dismisses without much discussion). This is 
indeed an unusual characterization since arguments of this kind were exceedingly 
abundant throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, right up to Locke’s own 
time. For instance, the mid-sixteenth century philosopher and theologian, Francisco de 
Vitoria, argued that “Some sins, they say, are not against natural law, but only against 
positive divine law; and for these the barbarians cannot be invaded. But others, such as 
cannibalism, incest with mothers and sisters, or sodomy are against nature; and for these 
sins they may be invaded and compelled to give them [their lands] up.”100 In the late 
sixteenth century, the Italian jurist and Oxford professor Alberico Gentili writes: 
Therefore, I approve the more decidedly of the opinion of those who say that the 
cause of the Spaniards is just when they made war upon the Indians, who 
practiced abominable  lewdness even with beasts, and who ate human flesh, 
slaying men for that purpose. For such sines are contrary to human nature, and the 
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same is true of other sines recognized as such by all except haply by brutes and 
brutish men. And against such men, Isocrates says, war is made as against brutes. 
Thus in a state any one whatever is allowed to accuse an offender against the 
community, even one who is not a member of the state when an action is defended 
which is not peculiar to the state but of interest to all men.101 
 
Hugo Grotius makes a similar claim in the mid-seventeenth century: “that kings, and 
those who are invested with a power equal to that of kings, have a right to exact 
punishment, not only for injuries committed against themselves, or their subjects, but 
likewise, for those who do not peculiarly concern them, but which are, in any persons 
whatsoever, grievous violations of the law of nature or nations.”102 Some of these 
violations of the natural law include being inhuman to one’s parents, cannibalism, and 
piracy.103  
 Since it is clear that in the mid to late seventeenth century there was an 
intellectual climate that privileged arguments about native peoples’ guilt, it is significant 
that Locke both calls his doctrine “strange” and that he never explicitly employs anything 
close to this language when speaking about Amerindians. In fact, when Locke speaks of 
punishment for violating the natural law, he quite explicitly has in mind only those those 
who “renounce” (§11) or “quit reason” (§181), which seems to imply that only those who 
could have known better are punitively guilty of violating the natural law. Locke writes: 
It is the unjust use of force then, that puts a man into the state of war with another; 
and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life: for quitting reason, 
which is the rule given between man and man, and using force, the way of beasts, 
he becomes liable to be destroyed by him he uses force against, as any savage 
ravenous beast, that is dangerous to his being (§181, my emphasis). 
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What is significant about embracing the “way of beasts” is not so much being a beast 
than it is the reversion from a state of reason (civil society) back into the state of nature. 
Here, it is quite clear the beastly degenerates Locke has in mind are absolutist kings, not 
native peoples. To be sure, savage ravenous beasts cannot quit reason. Since princes are 
educated in civil society, they should know better than to resort back to the pre-political, 
re-rational way of beasts. Jeremy Waldron makes this point as well; he writes 
To the extent that Locke had a political interest in persuading people to bestialize 
 offenders against the law of nature, his intended targets were not the idle poor, or 
the working class, or native Americans. His targets were absolutist kings and 
princes—those who in their actions and their politics violated (precisely) the 
principles of basic equality, and treated their subjects like slaves.104 
 
Tully, however, disagrees with this reading. He writes, “I am quite aware that 
these passages in Chapters 2 and 3 are standardly interpreted as references to the right to 
punish Charles the II in an armed revolt. Be this as it may, the very terms Locke uses to 
describe the offenders who may be ‘destroyed’ are the terms used to describe and 
dehumanize Amerindians in the books in Locke’s library.”105 What I think Tully’s 
argument does not explain is why Locke refers to what would otherwise have been a 
relatively common argument—the right to punish ‘savages’ in the state of nature that 
Vitoria, Gentili, and Grotius speak of—as a strange doctrine. The only sense in which 
this could be seen as strange is if Locke was employing it in a nonconventional way. And, 
to be sure, it certainly would have been surprising to turn such a predictable argument on 
its head in the way that Locke does; that is, one not only has the right but what may be 
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seen as a moral obligation to punish not native peoples but degenerate kings who have 
“quit reason” by entering a state of war with their citizenry.  
 Amerindian innocence can be back to several places in the Second Treatise where 
Locke argues that reason is properly cultivated only in the context of civil society. Reason 
“teaches all mankind” (§6), but the inconveniences one faces in the state of nature 
attenuate and distract from this learning process. Locke associates the capability to know 
the natural law with the “state of maturity” (§59). And elsewhere he argues that “To turn 
him [a man] loose to an unrestricted liberty, before he has reason to guide him is not 
allowing him the privilege of his nature, to be free; but to thrust him out amongst brutes, 
and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of man, as theirs” 
(§63). This line of thinking is not only a logical extension of the rejection of innate ideas, 
but it also seems to hearken back to the possibility of Aristotelian mental retreat which 
life in civil society affords some of its more qualified members.106 By overcoming the 
inconveniences of the state of nature, individuals now have enough leisure time to 
enhance their uncultivated reason.  
Leo Strauss makes this point as well; he argues that “The natural law belongs to 
'the secrets of nature'; it is also those who lack the leisure to occupy themselves with the 
study of the sensibly perceived things and with the higher knowledge which arises from 
that study, are necessarily ignorant of the natural law.”107 And later, “The generosity of 
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nature is extremely limited. This being the case, we may add, the large majority of men 
do not have the leisure required for becoming aware of the natural law, or their ignorance 
of the natural law cannot be due to their fault.”108 Within the framework of Locke’s 
thought this shows that native inhabitants of the new world could not “quit reason” in the 
same way monarchs could. Locke, in fact, makes a very clear distinction between mere 
rational capacity and reason as a “state of knowledge” (§170). What is more, Locke also 
speaks favorably of Amerindians “native rustic reason” which “is likelier to open a way 
to, and add to the common stock of mankind, rather than any scholastic proceedings by 
the strict rules of mode and figure.”109 What I think this phrasing suggests is that Locke 
was just as mesmerized by the potential located in the “uncultivated reason” of the native 
inhabitants of the new world as he was with the vast swaths of “unused” land to be found 
there.  
This reading of Locke is also supported by the kinds of travel writers he appealed 
to. Ann Talbot, for instance, explains that “Since Locke used Garcilasco in both Treatises 
he must have been an important travel writer to him. Garcilasco shared Las Casas' desire 
to repudiate derogatory views of the Native Americans.”110 In other words, far from 
seeing the native inhabitants of the new world as sub-human brutes or beasts who deserve 
punishment for violating the nature law, Locke sees them as something closer to proto-
European. Indeed, within Locke’s writing it is difficult to pinpoint what it is that the 
Amerindians were guilty of that opens them up to the terrible retribution that 
                                                 
108Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953). 214. 
109John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London, 1836). Book IV, §6, 519. 
110Ann Talbot, “The Great Ocean of Knowledge”: The Influence of Travel Literature on the Work of John 
Locke (Leiden, 2010).  123. 
  40   
 
philosophers and Christian moralists argued for. Locke writes, “a young Savage has, 
perhaps, his Head filled with Love and Hunting, according to the Fashion of his Tribe. 
But he that from a Child untaught, or a wild Inhabitant of the Woods, will expect there 
abstract maxims and reputed Principle of Sciences, will, I fear, find himself mistaken. 
Such kinds of general Propositions are seldom mentioned in the Huts of Indians.”111 Not 
only is this imagery rather pastoral, it again confirms that Locke believed native peoples 
were simply unaware of certain “abstract maxims” and “general propositions” and 
therefore could not be held responsible for violating them. 
 It is slightly more plausible that Locke was concerned with the wasteful use of 
property. For instance, Strauss argues that the defense of the natural law Locke appeals to 
is not the Christian morality of Vitoria, but a defense of his doctrine of property, which 
“is an institution of natural law.”112 In other words, Strauss is arguing that when Locke 
speaks of enforcing the laws of nature, he has in mind the wasteful use of property: “The 
terrors of the natural law no longer strike the covetous, but the waster. The natural law 
regarding property is concerned with the prevention of waste; in appropriating things by 
his labor, man must think exclusively of the prevention of waste; he does not have to 
think of other human beings.”113 Strauss, however, does not directly apply this logic to 
the European involvement with the native inhabitants of North America. But if this 
inference is correct and can be applied to North America, one would expect to find in 
Locke’s writing more emphasis on the wasteful negligence of native peoples. In some 
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places, superficially at least, this seems to be the case. At times we do see Locke 
characterizing Amerindians as wasteful, or at least inefficient. For instance, in the famous 
passage in section 41 of the Second Treatise, Locke argues that a day-laborer in England 
is better off than an American king. And elsewhere he argues that God “gave [the world] 
to the use of the industrious and rational… not to the fancy or covetousness of the 
quarrelsome and contentious” (§34). In a cursory way these claims appear to justify 
bringing the terrors of the natural law onto native peoples; however, it remains to be seen 
whether Locke intended such passages to undermine Amerindian land claims in North 
America. 
In a certain respect, this brings us back to Tuck's argument that Locke is engaging 
in a polemic against William Penn for being too generous with the native peoples regard 
their land claims. In Tuck’s view, what was so problematic for Locke was that “William 
Penn, though he accepted English title to his province, nevertheless respected the Indian 
right of domain and extinguished it only by purchase.”114 This is problematic because 
Tuck believes Locke is arguing that Amerindians had no land rights (due to moral 
degeneracy and/or wasteful incompetence), and therefore, they did not need to be 
consulted in terms of colonial appropriation of North American land. While it may be true 
that Locke did not believe Amerindians actually owned some of the tracts of land that 
they laid claim to, it is not clear that their title was in question due to some punitive 
measure. To believe that the native inhabitants of the new world did not own all the land 
in the new world did not mean they did not own some of it. After all, as the great 
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biographer of Shaftesbury, K.H.D. Haley, explains, on Shaftesbury’s and Locke’s orders 
“no-one [in the Carolina colony] was allowed to take up land within two and a half miles 
of any Indian village.”115 And we also know that Shaftesbury and presumably Locke 
“preferred to forcible conquest the method of ‘purchasing’ the land from [the Indians]; it 
was more humane, cheaper, and less troublesome.”116 These are rather telling policies. 
And elsewhere, even though Locke doesn’t explicitly say much about native American 
land rights, he makes it clear that the fruit or venison the “wild Indian” acquires is his, 
and that “as much land as a man till, plants, and improves…is his property” (§§26, 32), 
which would certainly cover Amerindian agricultural practices. Indeed, Stuart Banner 
explains that “By the time Locke wrote [the Second Treatise ...] every English colonist 
knew very well that the Indians were farmers and that they had a system of property.”117 
Banner, however, argues that while Locke knew this, he disingenuously rejects all 
aboriginal land claims. 
To Banner’s credit, there is enough opacity in Locke’s writing to problematize 
native peoples’ land claims. Locke does write that “if either the grass of his enclosure 
rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying 
up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, 
and might be the possession of any other” (§38). But this passage, and the passage from 
section 34 quoted above, appear to be directed at a slightly different audience than the 
native peoples. In the passage from section 38, it is more likely that Locke is looking to 
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restrain greedy colonists who have enclosed more land than could feasibly be worked. 
Arneil also makes this point; she writes, “Locke's concern with the taking up of too much 
ground … is again rooted in the experience of the colonies, in which land was too often 
appropriated in vast quantities and even enclosed without having the number of people 
necessary to cultivate the land therein.”118 Tully also show that Shaftesbury and Locke 
had a very difficult time regulating and restraining the colonists who had settled in 
Carolina. The settlers routinely flouted new laws and even violently revolted against the 
Proprietors at least once in 1679.119 This is perhaps to be expected from individuals who 
are being ruled by lords who lived so far away. Haley goes on to explain that “Locke and 
Ashley tried to guard against [the lack of general acceptance of the Fundamental 
Constitutions] by laying down that all free men must subscribe to them before becoming 
qualified to own an estate, and by declaring that no one should be able to interpret or 
comment on them.”120 Even still, he says “the trouble was that the colonists in the 
swamps of Carolina… saw no reason to respect leadership from thousands of miles away 
by people who had never seen the coasts of Carolina.”121 To be sure, it seems the 
Proprietors had much more to worry about from the European settlers than their native 
neighbors. 
Furthermore, when Locke speaks of the land being given to the “industrious and 
rational” in section 34, it is striking that he does not contrast this with hunters and gathers 
(which would be the obvious argument to make from the standpoint of dispossession), 
                                                 
118 Arneil, “Trade, Plantations, and Property,” 607. 
119 Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy, 144. 
120 Haley, Shaftesbury, 247. 
121 Ibid., 252. 
  44   
 
but with the “covetous and quarrelsome.” These are people, he goes onto explain, who 
hope to benefit from the labor of others. This seems to be another swipe at the landed 
nobility who live off the labor of their subjects. On the surface this may seem ironic since 
the Proprietors of the Carolinas were benefiting from the labor of the settlers. But, as 
indicated above, in principle Locke believed that scholars and nobles had a responsibility 
to work the land at least some of the time.  
 Further damaging to Tuck’s thesis is that not only did Shaftesbury prefer to buy 
land from the native inhabitants, but we never see Locke mentioning much less criticizing 
Penn’s method for acquiring property in land.122 We also do not see Locke explicitly 
advocating the appropriation of what Locke would have to characterize as enclosed, 
cultivated aboriginal lands. We see just the opposite; Shaftesbury and Locke required the 
colonists to maintain a respectable distance from their villages. The discussion about 
dispossession, therefore, should not be about whether or not Locke believed the native 
inhabitants of America had any right to land and possessions—based on his own 
formulation of land acquisition through labor, certainly they had some rights. The real 
question that Locke seeks to address is how far these land claims extend—i.e. whether 
the native peoples could legitimately lay claim to the tracts of land they did not 
physically occupy or cultivate. While this is, to be sure, a form of dispossession, it is 
clearly of a different character than the outright violence and terror advocated by some.123 
                                                 
122See Armitage, Foundations, 94. 
123 For instance, Machiavelli writes, “The other way in which war is brought about is when a whole people 
with all its families leave a place, driven thence either by famine or by war, and sets out to look for a new 
home and a new country in which to live. In this case it does not, as in the previous case, merely govern 
there, but it takes possession of every single thing, and expels or kills the old inhabitants.” Niccolo 
Machiavelli, The Discourses (New York, 1983). II.8. 294. 
  45   
 
What I mean is, I do not believe Locke’s conception of property acquisition was merely 
an expedient attempt to dispossess natives of their land.124 It was the logical outgrowth of 
an important seventeenth-century debate about the nature of property. 
The starting point of this problem was how to conceptualize uncultivated 
expanses of land. In this regard it is important that Locke viewed America as a clear 
example of the state of nature: “Thus, in the beginning the whole world was America” 
(§49)—an uncultivated expanse of land that was ripe for appropriation by anyone who 
would apply the requisite labor. Locke repeatedly refers to the “in-land, vacant places of 
America,” (§36) and the “uncultivated waste of America” (§37). Elsewhere Locke 
explains, “there are still great tracts of ground to be found which (the inhabitants thereof 
not having joined with the rest of mankind in the consent of the use of their common 
money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do or can make use of, 
and so still lie in common” (§45). This is important because when Locke talks about 
America, one does not get the impression that Amerindians deserve punishment for the 
inefficient use of land as much as the fact that there is just so much land that is not being 
used that European settlers are simply entitled to appropriate what they can use, that is, as 
long as they don't take too much, and they can feasibly work the amount of land they 
have claimed.  
Owning ‘Vacant’ Lands: 
 Locke’s emphasis on vacancy in North America is important because it signals 
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where the force of his argument is directed. In Locke’s time there was, in fact, an 
important debate as to whether apparently vacant lands should be considered truly vacant. 
Samuel Pufendorf, a man who Locke admired, argues that labor, understood as agrarian 
cultivation, does not exclusively demonstrate that a piece of land is owned. He argues 
that there might be an operative convention among the native peoples in America that 
established the vast, unused land as private property. Pufendorf writes, 
But it is not necessary that all things which are occupied in this universal manner 
should  be divided among individuals and pass into private hands. Therefore if 
anything be discovered in such an area that is still without a private owner, it 
should not at once be regarded as unoccupied, and free to be taken by any man as 
his own, but it will be  understood to belong to the whole people.125 
 
And in the following year, Pufendorf argues in De officio hominis et civis (1673) that 
“when any Number of Men jointly possess themselves of any Tract of Land, ‘tis 
customary to assign to each Member of the Company a Share, and to account what is left 
undivided to belong to the Society in common.”126 Notice that for Pufendorf it is 
agreement between a “Number of Men” that determines the ownership, not one’s mixture 
of agrarian labor with the land. Individuals need not cultivate their land agriculturally to 
possess it. In the very next passage Pufendorf explains that this title gives the first 
occupant right to the “wild Beasts, Birds, and Fishes living in the Sea, Rivers, or Lakes 
thereunto appertaining.”127 Quite simply, according to Pufendorf’s analysis, the native 
peoples could possess their lands without cultivating them; conventions between tribes 
could establish the basis for hunting rights. 
                                                 
125Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo, Volume 17, Part 2 trans. Walter Simons 
(Oxford, 1934 [1672]). 571. 
126 Samuel Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature trans. Andrew Tooke, eds. 
Ian Hunter and David Saunders (Indianapolis, 2003 [1673]). XI. VI., 131.  
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Richard Tuck makes a convincing case that Locke was directly engaging 
arguments like this from Pufendorf due to the fact that he finally succeeded in purchasing 
a copy of De Officio Hominis et Civis in 1681, right around the time he was composing 
the Second Treatise.128 This circumstantial evidence becomes more compelling when one 
begins to notice the conceptual problems Pufendorf’s formulation of property poses for 
Locke’s philosophy. Tully explains that  
The different and opposed definitions of Pufendorf and Locke embody two 
radically different views of the relations of man to the world. For Pufendorf, 
property expresses man’s right to dominate the world; for Locke, it expressed 
man’s privilege to use a world which is not essentially his own and which is to be 
used, and not abused, for purpose not his own, of preservation and enjoyment.129   
    
In other words, Locke could not approve of a convention-based approach to private 
property since it reduces to dominance and private indulgence. The owner of an 
uncultivated swath of land does not appear to be responsible to, either politically or 
economically, anyone beyond the agreement between a Number of Men. As indicated 
above, Rawls and Dunn indicate above, Locke’s conception of property was deeply 
theocentric; “our rights and duties derive from God’s ownership of us.” It is quite clear 
that Locke’s formulation of property must be understood in terms of positive duties and a 
common good.  
 The exclusive privacy of Pufendorf’s conception of property poses at least one 
other conceptual problem for Locke, namely that of taxonomy of ownership. The fact that 
land is either divided or left in common means that is not amenable to the degrees of 
ownership that Locke must assume for the existence of civil society. Tully writes, “To say 
                                                 
128 Tuck, Law of War and Peace, 168. 
129 Tully, Discourse on Property, 72. 
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that property cannot belong in the same manner and in whole to more than one person is 
to deny that common ownership is a form of property. A possession may belong to 
several persons in different ways, each having a different degree or kind of control over 
it.”130 Recall how Locke stipulates that once an individual consents to join civil society, 
his property comes under the jurisdiction of the law and cannot be extracted from this 
arrangement (§120). Locke’s interest in this notion of communal ownership stems not 
only from his belief that private property is a communal good, but it also concerns the 
actual existence of communally held lands that were no longer in the state of nature in 
places like England. He writes, “Tis true, in land that is common, in England, or any 
other country where there is plenty of people under government, who have many and 
commerce, no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the consent of all his 
fellow-commoners; because this is left in common by compact” (§35). Locke contrasts 
this with the state of nature where the consent of all humans is not required for one to lay 
claim to and enclose land; one must simply leave “enough—and as good” for others to 
use (§33).  
For Locke, unused land can then only take two forms: that which is held in 
common and protected by the laws of a commonwealth, and that which remains in the 
state of nature and is open to enclosure as long as there is enough left to go around. This 
distinction explains why Locke attempted to assess whether the native communities 
qualified as commonwealths.131 Quoting Josephus Acosta, Locke argues that “in many 
                                                 
130 Ibid. 
131 In this respect, Locke’s anthropology is clearly deficient. Blatz argues that Locke’s theorizing reflects 
“the crude anthropological descriptions of French, English, and Spanish travelers in the New World” he 
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parts of America there was no government at all”; native peoples “had neither kings nor 
commonwealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas, 
those of Brasil, and many other nations which have no certain kings, but choose their 
captains as they please” (§102).132 Tully more fully outlines why Locke would not have 
seen Amerindians participating in what he thinks of as legitimate “political societies”; 
ultimately, they “lack the European institutions that, according to Locke, constitute the 
universal criteria of political society.”133 Tully no doubt has in mind those passages in the 
Second Treatise that suggest commercial infrastructure is necessary to manage the 
inevitable surpluses of production. Locke writes: 
for I ask, what would a man value ten thousand, or an hundred thousand acres of 
 excellent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with cattle, in the middle of 
the inland parts of America, where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts 
of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the product? It would not be 
worth the inclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild common of 
nature, whatever was more than would supply the conveniences of life to be had 
there for him and his family. (§48) 
 
But Locke also believes that there are just too few native peoples in North America, “and 
want of people and money gave men no temptation to enlarge their possession of land, or 
contest for wider extent of ground” (§108). What I think these passages show is that 
Locke believes because there are so few native peoples and no commercial infrastructure 
in North America, there is nothing to support the Pufendorfian argument that 
Amerindians own the vast uncultivated acreage in the “middle inland part of America.” It 
                                                                                                                                                 
History of Ideas 35:4 (1974). 663-670. 664. 
132Elsewhere Locke reaffirms the claim that chieftains in the West-Indies are not proper commonwealths 
because the chief has “no other power but to command [his people] in time of common war against, their 
common enemies.” (John Locke, “A Third Letter for Toleration,” in The Works of John Locke Vol. 5 
[Oxford, 1824]. 225). 
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belongs to the “wild common of nature,” which remains up for grabs.  
As a brief aside, the debate about whether or not the early American tribes could 
be construed as commonwealths was also common among American settlers as well. In 
John Winthrop's History of New England from 1630 to 1649 we find a similar discussion 
of the principles of the commonwealth taking place in a missionary meeting with the 
local natives.134 A native asks an Englishman about the first beginnings of a 
commonwealth, to which the he replies: 
the first principle of a commonwealth was salt, for (saith he) by means of salt we 
can keep our flesh and fish, to have it ready when we need it, whereas you lose 
much for want of it, and are sometimes ready to starve. A second principle is iron, 
for thereby we fell trees, build houses, till our land, etc. A third is, ships, by which 
we carry forth such commodities as we have to spare, and fetch in such as we 
need, as cloth, wine, etc. Alas! (saith the Indian) then I fear, we shall never be a 
commonwealth, for we can neither make salt, nor iron, nor ships.135 
 
 What I think this analysis reveals is that Locke was not concerned with 
Amerindian land rights overall; he was primarily interested in providing a theoretical 
framework that could make sense of the vast swaths of land that remained uncultivated. 
And yet, as clear (and problematic) as this argument is, I think that this only represents 
part of the analysis of Locke colonial agenda. If one consults Locke's extensive 
devotional writings on religion and Christianity, it seems clear that he also had an interest 
in exposing Amerindians to Protestant dogma, and that this was critically supplemented 
by “proper” land use—indeed, these are interlaced components of Locke's conception of 
the natural law. The reasonableness of Christianity would become apparent under 
                                                 
134See John Winthrop, History of New England from 1630 to 1649 Vol. II, ed. James Kendall Hosmer (New 
York, 1908). Even though this work is strikingly compatible with Locke's own thought, he could not have 
been familiar with it; even though as the title suggests, it was written in the 1630s and 40s, it was not 
published until 1790. 
135Ibid., 320-21 
  51   
 
conditions of economic prosperity and political security.  
Evangelism: 
 Thinking of Locke as nominally tolerant of Amerindian paganism (or at least not 
seeing it as a punishable offense that undermines Amerindian land rights) can be 
supplemented by recent scholarship on Locke's involvement with Protestant evangelism 
in the America. While certain scholars have looked at the significance of Locke’s 
religious devotion, it has remained underdeveloped in terms of his rationale for 
colonization. For instance, John Dunn and Quentin Skinner see the Second Treatise as 
“the classic text of radical Calvinist politics.”136 Isaac Kramnick sees Chapter 5 of the 
Second Treatise full of “Protestant language,” where a “Protestant God [enjoins] 
industrious man to subdue the earth through work and thus to realize himself.”137 And 
Barbara Arneil writes that “for Locke, the English appropriation of aboriginal land is both 
theological and a natural right. The final element in all of these ... justifications for 
English claims in America is that they will cause aboriginal population no injury. Rather, 
these populations will gain from the superior English knowledge, skills, and 
technology.138 At Arneil's end of the spectrum, the natural right of property is a basic 
component of the natural law that is an exportable dogma. Jack Turner extends this thesis 
a bit further, however, by convincingly showing that Locke was much more involved 
with Protestant evangelism to the African slaves and native peoples than initially thought, 
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and that this ought to be factored in to his rationale for European colonization.139 
 For instance, Turner shows that in Locke's Third Letter for Toleration (1692): 
Though Locke conceded that Paganism was an “abomination,” he argued that for 
the purposes of evangelization, it was better that Pagans practice an “abominable” 
religion than no religion at all. Prohibiting Pagan worship would not draw the 
Pagans closer to Christianity, but would “make them downright irreligious, and 
render the very notion of a Deity insignificant, and of no influence.”140 
 
What Locke had in mind is something very close to More’s Utopian colonial strategy. 
After taking up “land left over and uncultivated” the colonists would “adopt any natives 
who choose to live with them. Assenting willingly to the same style of life and the same 
customs, the natives are easily assimilated, and that to the advantage of both groups. For 
by means of their institutions the Utopians make the land easily support both peoples, 
whereas before it provided a meager and skimpy living for one.”141 Likewise, Locke also 
believes that close cohabitation with the native peoples would lead to a kind of civil and 
religious assimilation. To be sure, these modes of assimilation were in some sense coeval. 
Locke differs from the Utopian approach in that he poses an active strategy for 
proselytization. In “Some of the Chief Grievances of the present constitution of Virginia, 
with an Essay towards the Remedies thereof” (1697), an article Locke coauthored with 
James Blair, Locke argues “that as many Indian children be educated at the Colledge [of 
William and Mary] as may be; and these well instructed in the Christian Faith, (but with 
all keeping their own language) and made fit to evangelize others of their nation and 
                                                 
139See Jack Turner, “John Locke, Christian Mission, and Colonial America,” Modern Intellectual History 
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language.”142 The idea here is that under the auspices of toleration, a covertly evangelical 
agenda can be realized.143 Native peoples can keep their own language, that is, for the 
purpose of evangelizing their fellow tribesmen. 
 Passages like these further undermine the “punishment” thesis. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see how punishment would factor in the framework of colonization at all. I 
believe this explains why (pace Tuck) Locke emphasizes retributive justice over a more 
expansive right to punish in the Second Treatise; the fact that Locke “nowhere implies 
that those powers [of life and death and making war] might include the right to punish 
rather than retaliate” was not an oversight, but a key component to his evangelizing 
agenda in the colonies.144 Locke repeatedly emphasizes reparation and restraint (§8). It 
was only the settlers who had suffered violence at the hands of native peoples who were 
entitled to retributive violence. In the First Treatise, Locke writes, “A planter in the West 
Indies […] might, if he pleased, (who doubts?) muster up  [an army] and lead them out 
against the Indians, to seek reparation upon any injury received from them.”145 This, of 
course, does not preclude the fact that acts of “retribution” were routinely fabricated by 
the settlers; Locke's argument for punishing those who violate the state of nature may 
have been misappropriated by unscrupulous colonists. As has been shown, Locke's 
wishes were not always followed by the colonists in the Carolinas. Tully explains that 
                                                 
142Cited in ibid., 282. 
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“Locke introduced a temporary law [in the Carolinas] in 1672 forbidding Amerindian 
slavery and offering the native peoples individual plots of land under proprietary 
government,” which the settlers ignored.146 Despite the failure to implement this policy, it 
is clear that Locke was attempting to integrate native peoples into the colonial body 
politic. 
 Perhaps one of the clearest expressions of Locke's evangelical sensibilities can be 
found in The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina. Even though exclusive authorship 
is questionable, the following passage evinces clear Lockean themes: 
But since the natives of that place, who will be concerned in our plantation, are 
utterly  strangers to Christianity, whose idolatry, ignorance, or mistake gives us no 
right to expel,  or use them ill; and those who remove from other parts to plant 
there, will unavoidably be of different opinions concerning matters of religion, the 
liberty whereof they will expect to have allowed them, and it will not be 
reasonable for us on this account to keep them out; that civil peace may be 
maintained amidst the diversity of opinions, and our agreement and compact with 
all men may be duly and faithfully observed; the violations  whereof, upon what 
pretense soever, cannot be without great offence to Almighty God,  and great 
scandal to the true religion, which we process; and also that Jews, heathens, and 
other dissenters from the purity of Christian religion, may not be scared and kept 
at a distance from it, but by having an opportunity of acquainting themselves with 
the truth and reasonableness of its doctrines, and the peaceableness and 
inoffensiveness of its professors, may by good usage and persuasion, and all 
those convincing methods of  gentleness and meekness, suitable to the rules and 
design of the gospel, be won over to embrace and unfeignedly receive the truth; 
therefore any seven or more persons, agreeing in any religion, shall constitute a 
Church or profession, to which they shall give some name, to distinguish it from 
others.147 
 
Not only does Locke believe that the native inhabitants’ “ignorance” does not open them 
up to punishment, this passage also shows that part of the logic of close cohabitation is 
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for the “heathens” to “have an opportunity of acquainting themselves with the truth.” 
What Locke has in mind here is not simply the acceptance of religious dogma, but also 
that they might adopt the kind of agrarian and labor practices that underwrite civil 
society; enclosure and the efficient use of the land is the means by which civil society and 
Christian virtue become plausible. 
 Thomas Jefferson, Locke's great political interpreter, also believed that the native 
peoples ought to be assimilated in the Euro-American society by means of agrarian 
practices.148 Arneil writes that “In January 1802 the President [Jefferson] tells a visiting 
delegation of Amerindians that the United States will 'with great pleasure see your people 
become disposed to cultivate the earth, to raise herds of the useful animals and to spin 
and weave, for their food and clothing, these resources are certain; they will never 
disappoint you, while those of hunting may fail.'”149 A little later she writes: 
It is clear, however, that Jefferson believed that, in the long term, the Cherokee 
nation  would survive only if it chose the former route—namely, transforming 
itself from its natural state into civil society with the requisite Lockean conditions 
of agrarian labour, private property, and regular law. Thus, in a message to the 
Cherokee people dated 9 January 1809, Jefferson writes: “I sincerely wish you 
may succeed in your laudable endeavours to save the remains of your nation by 
adopting industrious occupation and a government of regular law.”150 
 
 We get a further sense of Locke's evangelizing strategy in his “A Letter 
Concerning Toleration,” in which he (again) explicitly addresses the problem of forceful 
conversion of Amerindians. He begins by arguing that “Not even Americans, subjected 
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unto a Christian prince, are to be punished either in body or goods for not embracing our 
faith and worship. If they are persuaded that they please God in observing the rites of 
their own country, and that they shall obtain happiness by that means, they are to be left 
unto God and themselves.”151 This is in part strategic, but not exclusively so. Elsewhere 
Locke argues that conversion by force might be turned against Christian settlers whose 
religious practices are considered “deviant” by the “heathen” majority. But Locke goes 
on to offer what appears to be his own sense of how the Christian religion might take 
hold in North America. He writes: 
Thus it is: an inconsiderable and weak number of christians, destitute of every 
thing, arrive in a pagan country; these foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the 
bowels of humanity, that they would succour them with the necessaries of life; 
those necessaries are  given them, habitations are granted, and they all join 
together and grow up into one body of people. The Christian religion by this 
means takes root in that country, and spreads itself.152 
 
Locke then proceeds to explain how this approach to colonization might be hijacked by 
those who wish to forcefully impose Christianity on their pagan cohabitants. He was 
deeply concerned that “the case of souls, serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and 
ambition.”153  
Locke believes that the sheer reasonability and effectiveness of Christianity will 
obviate the need for violence. Elwood Worcester, a nineteenth century chronicler of 
Locke’s religious beliefs, explains that, for Locke, “the Gospel relies for its credit on 
certain miraculous matters of fact (e.g. the resurrection of Christ) which are not likely to 
be accepted at once by persons hearing them for the first time. For this work the Holy 
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Spirit of God is needed—not violence.”154  Given that Locke envisions the European 
settlers and Amerindians forming “one body of people,” it seems clear that Locke is 
confident that the Christian settlers can eventually convince those who “wholly 
disbelieve or doubted of the truth of the Christian Religion.”155 Indeed, part of the logic 
of his work on the “Reasonableness of Christianity” is to: 
Convince but Men of the Mission of Jesus Christ; make them but see the Truth, 
 Simplicity, and Reasonableness of what he himself Taught, and required to be 
believed by his Followers; and you need not doubt, but, being once fully 
perswaded of his Doctrine, and the Advantages which all Christians agree are 
received by him, such Converts will not lay by the Scriptures; but by a constant 
Reading and Study of them, get all the Light they can from this Divine 
Revelation; and nourish themselves up in the words of Faith, and of good 
Doctrin.156 
 
 As anti-primitivistic as this thinking is, it is predicated on what must be 
considered a then progressive view—that native peoples are in every sense as human as 
their Europeans counterparts, and that they should not be punished for their beliefs and 
cultural practices. This point was hardly settled in Locke's day.157 Locke makes it clear 
that Amerindian “paganism” is not only excusable, but understandable and to some 
limited extent acceptable; it might provide some small degree of happiness (albeit 
severely truncated). He explains: 
many, to whom the promise of the Messiah never came, and so were never in a 
capacity to believe or reject that revelation; yet God had, by the light of reason, 
revealed to all mankind, who would make use of that light, that he was good and 
merciful. The same spark of divine nature and knowledge in man, which making 
him a man, showed him the law he was under, as a man; showed him also the way 
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of atoning the merciful, kind,  compassionate Author and Father of him and his 
being, when he had transgressed the  law.158 
 
Even though native peoples are free from the threat of punishment (from their fellow 
humans and perhaps even God, that is, inasmuch as they utilize the “light of reason” to 
the best of their ability), Locke clearly thinks there is something lamentable in this partial 
actualization of human reason. He writes, “The Americans are not all born with worse 
understandings than the Europeans, though we see none of them have such reaches in the 
arts and sciences.”159 Locke clearly has this in mind when he envisions Europeans and 
Indians living peaceful together in civil society—of course, assuming Amerindians 
yielded to European land claims, and that they more-or-less assimilate into the agrarian, 
monetary-based economy, which are, to be sure, no small matters. It is compelling, 
however, that the Amerindians are not legally required to forgo their “paganism.” Not 
only was it beyond the scope of governmental power to legally enforce this kind of 
religious dogma, but Locke clearly thought that you could not force individuals to 
sincerely abandon their deeply held religious beliefs. There is a better chance that—as 
Marshall argues—they would be wooed to the merits of Christianity within an 
atmosphere of toleration (though, one wonders how long this strategy could last, 
especially when the ostensibly obvious truth of the Christian dogma is repeatedly 
rejected). 
 Locke seemed to believe that Amerindian paganism was simply the result of a 
kind of ignorance that would quickly be expelled with the introduction of the right sort of 
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knowledge, and in this sense, close cohabitation coupled with an atmosphere of toleration 
would quickly expose how misguided the beliefs of the native inhabitants were. William 
Chillingworth, a man who Locke greatly admired,160 wrote that “if an Indian, that never 
heard of Christ or Scripture, should by chance find a Bible in his own Language, and 
were able to read it, that upon the reading it, he would certainly, without a Miracle, 
believe it to be the Word of God.”161 In this respect, one wonders how Locke would have 
responded to the failed project of so-called “Praying Towns” that were prevalent in New 
England in the late seventeenth century. In New England alone there existed several 
dozen towns populated by Christian-converted natives, and in many cases these residents, 
some small number of whom were literate, did have copies of the Bible in their own 
languages.162 What is compelling about this experiment, which was the brainchild of John 
Eliot, was its utter unsustainability. It was after all the failure of assimilation, and the 
suspicion with which converted Amerindians were viewed among their own people, that 
led to the brutal and devastating King Philip’s War (1675-76), after which only four 
“Praying Towns” remained.163 Locke may have been familiar with King Philip’s War, it 
was sensationally reported in the London Gazette in August 1675, but he may not have 
been familiar with the dramatic refutation of his thesis that was playing out in New 
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England years before.164  
In any case, while Locke may have mostly agreed with Chillingworth’s about the 
miraculous power of scripture to win over those never before exposed to its message, he 
establishes at least one other necessary prerequisite for this conversion process to take 
hold: Locke believes that moral truth, and hence, the tools to realize the summum bonum 
in our lives, is directly linked to our pursuing and cultivating the “useful arts”; and that 
without the very real advances in this practical arena of human knowledge our conception 
of moral truth will necessarily be deficient. In the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Locke writes: 
From whence it is obvious to conclude, that since our faculties are not fitted to 
penetrate into the internal fabric and real essences of bodies; but yet plainly 
discover to us the being of a God, and the knowledge of ourselves, enough to lead 
us into a full and clear discovery of our duty and great concernment; it will 
become us, as rational creatures, to employ those faculties we have about what 
they are most adapted to and follow the direction of nature, where it seems to 
point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper employment 
lies in those inquiries, and in that sort of knowledge which is most suited to our 
natural capacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, i.e. the condition of our 
eternal state. Hence I think I may conclude, that morality is the proper science and 
business of mankind in general (who are both concerned and fitted to search out 
their summum bonum).165 
 
Locke continues this line of thinking by reflecting on 
what consequence the discovery of one natural body and its properties may be to 
human  life, the whole great continent of America is a convincing instance; whose 
ignorance in useful arts, and want of the greatest part of the conveniences of life, 
in a country that abounded with all sorts of natural plenty, I think may be 
attributed to their ignorance of what was to be found in a very ordinary despicable 
stone, I mean the mineral of iron. And whatever we think of our parts or 
improvement in this part of the world, where knowledge and plenty seem to vie 
                                                 
164 See Jill Lapore, The Name of the War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New 
York, 1998).  56. See also, Miru, John Locke and the Native Americans, 83-97. 
165Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding,  Book IV, Ch. 12, §11, 493. 
  61   
 
with each other; yet to any one that will seriously reflect on it, I suppose it will 
appear past doubt, that were the use of iron lost amongst us, we should in a few 
ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage 
Americans, whose natural endowments and provisions come no way short  of 
those of the most flourishing and polite nations.166 
 
What these passages show is that the act of improvement (which is exactly the language 
Locke uses with regard to property) is intimately linked with Protestant morality and the 
awareness of our eternal state—indeed, they are deeply entwined. And in many respects, 
the assimilation of native peoples would decisively prove this point. “Ancient savage 
Americans” have the same endowments as Europeans and therefore would certainly 
come to the same sorts of conclusions about God and the good life as the Anglo-
Europeans, that is, since these are the “science and business of mankind in general.” I 
believe this evinces a sincerity that is reflected in Locke’s opposition to the merciless 
misappropriation of Christian dogma for financial gain in the colonies. In this respect, 
one could argue that Locke sees the uncultivated rational capacity of the Amerindian as 
untapped resource—a kind of empirical verification of the reasonableness of Christianity. 
Framing his colonial thought in the language of collective good, the native peoples 
clearly had something to offer to the science of the good life, that is, under the political 
and economic conditions Locke believed this contribution could take place. It is for this 
reason that Locke believed in the propagating an agrarian ethic. The proper use of land 
necessarily entails the propagation of Christian virtue and morality; spiritual relationships 
                                                 
166Ibid., 494. I think this passage also verifies Talbot's argument about Locke's choice of travel literature: 
“In Garcilasco, Locke has chosen a writer who went out of his way to depict Europeans in a state of nature. 
We cannot escape the conclusion that Locke is applying the concept of the state of nature to Europeans and 
did not see it as a condition reserved for non-Europeans or early periods of history. As far as Locke was 
concerned, the state of nature was something to which contemporary Europeans could revert” (Talbot, The 
Great Ocean of Knowledge, 122). 
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are predicated on political and economic ones. 
Conclusion: 
 The purpose of this paper has been to understand and recapitulate Locke's 
thought, not to defend it, as such. Locke views are, of course, disconcerting today. Neal 
Wood, however, helps mitigate the tendency to paint Locke as a kind of extreme racist.167 
He explains that Locke's “view of natives and tribesmen was not marked by the negative 
attitude and anti-primitivism to be found in much contemporary and later literature on the 
subject.”168 Clearly, Locke’s thought is undeniably anti-primitivistic, as well as 
ethnocentric; plus, construing native peoples as remedially inferior comes close to what 
James Farr classifies as a form of “weak racism.”169 What Wood likely has in mind is that 
given the abundance of degrading ethnic rhetoric at that time, Locke's thought might still 
qualify as relatively progressive, despite the fact that his views provide a rationale for 
less sincere thinkers to pursue policies of punishment and violent dispossession.  
 I point this out, in part, to challenge the view that so-called paradoxes between 
Locke’s liberalism and his colonial policy either renders his thought incoherent, or it 
somehow fatally infects liberalism as a whole.170 Such criticisms suffer from a similar 
defect: they assume Locke was a liberal in some coherent and categorical way.171 To 
begin with, this overlooks the fact that Locke’s thought is more fundamentally organized 
                                                 
167For a compelling analysis of Locke's possible racism, see James Farr, “Locke, Natural Law, and New 
World Slavery,” Political Theory 36:4 (August, 2008), 495-522. 508-510. 
168Neal Wood, The Politics of Locke's Philosophy (Berkeley, 1983), 81-82. 
169James Farr, “So Vile and Miserable and Estate: The Problem of Slavery in Locke's Political Philosophy,” 
Political Theory 13 (1986). 263-89. 
170 See Wayne Glausser, “Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
51:2 (1990), 199-216; and Miura, John Locke and the Native Americans, 135-143. 
171 See Jerome Huyler, “Was Locke A Liberal?” The Independent Review 1:4 (1997). 523-42. 
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around the notions of sociability, civic-mindedness, and the obedience of certain duties 
that we owe to God. While it is no doubt true that Locke spends a great deal of time 
fleshing out what have become traditional liberal themes, e.g. liberty, rights, toleration, it 
is clear that these are entirely framed under the auspices of duty and obedience to God. 
Not only did God give mankind the world “for their benefit” (§34), but he ordained its 
proper uses. For the reasons explained above, Locke clearly privileges particular social 
and political structures to discover those uses. In this respect, Locke’s colonial thought is 
a logical outcome of certain initial assumptions about our duty to God. Even though we 
might find those assumptions disagreeable, there is no necessary contradiction between 
Locke’s so-called liberalism and his colonial philosophy.  
 In this paper I show that Locke’s colonial philosophy is not predicated on the 
punishment of native peoples for violating the natural law either in terms of their 
“savagery” or their “inefficient” use of land. Rather, Locke held sincerely religious 
beliefs that, to a significant degree, influenced his understanding of the colonial presence 
in North America. I have attempted to show that Locke’s colonial vision was theocentric. 
Not only were colonists under a divine obligation to be industrious and productive, in 
turn improving the common stock of mankind, Locke also believed the colonial 
possession of what he saw as unused lands (pace Pufendorf) was a justified implication 
of the way individual labor and property gives rise to civil society. Furthermore, Locke 
believed that under the auspices of toleration, Amerindians would begin to emulate 
agrarian practices which would in turn open them to the natural law, with all its Protestant 
overtones. Even though Locke’s colonial thought was deeply disconcerting, he 
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nevertheless had a striking dream; he envisioned the emergence of integrated political 
communities throughout North America where Amerindians and Europeans would 
converge to form “one body of people.”  
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Friends in the State of Nature: John Locke and the Formation of Security 
Communities 
In recent years John Locke has become a renewed source of interest for 
international relations theorists. Despite the still persistent claims that his writing is either 
incoherent or unsystematic when it comes to international affairs, a growing number of 
theorists have found in Locke’s thought underappreciated contributions to IR theory. Just 
what these contributions are, however, is still up for debate. As Lee Ward indicates, 
“renewed interest does not imply consensus.”172 Nevertheless, interpreters of Locke’s 
thought tend to fall into one of two camps. The first is the modernist-realist school which 
sees Locke’s international thought as crypto-Hobbesian. According this tradition, Locke 
is described as a staunch mercantilist who sees states as hyper-egoistic appropriators in an 
anarchic system best characterized by antipathy and rivalry. In this world, international 
partnerships (if they happen at all) take the form of temporary alliances rooted in 
objective goods and relative gains.173 The second school is the liberal-legalist tradition 
which characterizes Locke’s state of anarchy as fundamentally governed by the law of 
nature.174 According to this approach, the very possibility of international law is rooted in 
both the ability of states to discern these laws of nature and to hold themselves (and to a 
limited extent each other) accountable. This vision of global politics anticipates and, 
indeed, expects that international communities will emerge that exercise restraint by way 
of reciprocal agreements based on self-compliance to international law, which 
                                                 
172 Lee Ward, John Locke and Modern Life (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 262. 
173 See Alex Bellamy, Security Communities and their Neighbors: Regional Fortresses or Global 
Integrators? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 6. 
174 “Liberal-legalist” is from Michael Doyle and Geoffrey Carlson, “Silence of the Laws? Conceptions of 
International Relations and International Law in Hobbes, Kant, and Locke,” Columbia Journal of 
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  66   
 
presumably are rooted in some mutually held conception of the natural law. 
What this paper intends to show is that the liberal-legalist tradition, while on the 
right track, is missing an important component of Locke’s state of nature, namely the role 
that friendship and trust plays in consolidating and cementing these communities. For 
instance, in an early and easily overlooked passage in the Second Treatise, Locke argues 
that in the state of nature “self-love will make men partial to themselves and their 
friends” (ST: §13, my emphasis). And in his early writings on the law of nature, Locke 
wrestled with the implications of positing an egoist self-interested foundation to the 
natural law, and came to believe that: 
the foundation of the law of nature cannot be such that, if it is adopted, all justice, 
friendship and generosity must disappear from human existence…If the rightness 
of any action is a function of its expediency and men are obliged to conform to 
that standard in their actions, then I cannot see how anyone could give anything to 
a friend, offer him hospitality, or carry out some task on his behalf, or in any other 
way do him a favor, unless he was prepared to break this law.175 
 
Locke concluded that “the observation of the law of nature leads to peace, harmony, 
friendship, security of person and property, and, to sum up in one word, happiness… 
Self-interest is not the foundation of the law of nature, or the reason for obeying it, 
although it is the consequence of obedience to it.”176 
  These would be rather odd claims for a closeted Hobbesian to make, since 
Hobbes argues that without a common power “every man is Enemy to every man.”177 
What is more, since friendship intuitively implies some degree of trust, one would think 
that liberal-legalists would speculate about this potentially powerful motivation for 
                                                 
175 John Locke, “From Essays on the Law of Nature,” Locke: Political Writings, ed. David Wootton 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003). pp. 182-183.   
176 Ibid. 
177 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed. Richard Tuck (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). p. 89. 
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compliance to commonly held values between those in a state of anarchy.178 In what 
follows, I will show that global politics for Locke should not merely be thought of as 
“enlightened” states voluntarily complying to the natural law; but rather that the 
international law is the product of positive arrangements made between states in trust, 
that is, agreements rooted in friendship, kinship, and value-solidarity. What I think this 
shows is that in Locke’s conception of the state of nature one finds an early formulation 
of what we now call “security communities,” a term developed by Karl Deutsch in the 
late 1950s to designate groups of people who have integrated to such an extent that there 
exists a “real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other 
physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”179 Locke appears to 
characterize the international community not only in terms of moral communities (where 
different regions of the world share different values), but also in terms of economic 
communities of varying degrees of interdependence. This interdependence, however, 
cannot simply be equated with rational deliberation of autonomous units contracting 
themselves together out of sheer self-interest. Political communities are not animated by 
expediency or rigid duty to the natural law, but by friendship and trust. This is a 
compelling reading given the fact that questions of trust have gained renewed attention in 
IR literature in the recent years.180 Quite simply, Locke’s reflections on trust and 
                                                 
178 While it is true that friendship implies trust, clearly the reverse is not necessarily true—trust doesn’t 
always imply friendship. Entrusting political power to a ruler does not imply friendship. The point here is 
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179 Deutsch quoted in John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to 
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180 For instance, see: Aaron Hoffman, Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict (New 
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friendship and the emergence of value communities have been entirely overlooked. 
  This paper is roughly divided into two parts. The first section will broadly 
characterize the two interpretive traditions within IR theory that have emerged to 
appropriate John Locke’s thought: the modernist-realist and the liberal-legalist. The 
second section of this paper will, as indicated above, attempt to elaborate on the liberal-
legalist tradition by way of the often over-looked element of Locke’s description of the 
state of nature, namely that he posits pre-political communities which are characterized 
by a state of friendship, familial affection, and trust. Furthermore, it is an innate 
sociability that precipitates the movement from the state of nature into civil society. 
The Modernist-Realist Tradition 
The modernist-realist approach to Locke situates his writing in the tradition of 
Machiavelli and Hobbes. This reading of Locke focuses on the fact that he spends very 
little time addressing the role the natural law plays in the relationships among nations. As 
Charles Beitz points out, even though Locke explicitly analogizes the relationship of 
states to that of individuals in the state of nature (in ST: §§14, 145), he “paid little 
attention to the specific requirements of the law of nature as applied to international 
relations.”181 Accordingly, this interpretive approach places a great deal of emphasis on 
the impotence of natural law in the state of anarchy, and on the primacy of sovereignty, 
self-defense, and self-interest as regulating principles in international affairs.  
While many thinkers (going all the way back to Locke’s own day) portray 
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181 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
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Locke’s thought, at least in certain places, as Hobbesian, Leo Strauss was the first to 
characterize Locke as a closeted Hobbesian.182 According to this view, whatever 
differences one finds between Hobbes and Locke is the product of an elaborate ruse. The 
principal clue to this reading, for Strauss, was that Locke “never made a serious effort to 
elaborate that code [the law of nature],” and this was because “there does not exist a law 
of nature in the strict sense.”183 In subsequent years, many of Strauss’s students—for 
example, Richard Cox, Robert Goldwin, and Thomas Pangle—have elaborated on and 
extended this reading.184 In his attack on the idealist-realist dichotomy in IR theory, 
which “opposes Locke to Machiavelli,” Cox argues that this taxonomy fails to “consider 
the possibility that Locke ultimately has more in common with Machiavelli than with 
Plato.”185 Indeed, as John Dunn explains, “Commentators such as Leo Strauss and 
Richard Cox have seen the core of Locke’s politics as the conviction that humans are as 
radically untrustworthy as Hobbes depicted them as being, and have insisted accordingly 
that Locke’s conception of the state of nature is distinguishable from that of Hobbes only 
                                                 
182 For earlier Hobbesian references, see William Dunning, “The Political Philosophy of John Locke,” 
Political Science Quarterly, 20 (1905). p. 230; and George Sabine, History of Political Theory (New York: 
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by the degree of evasion with which Locke elects initially to describe it.”186 And 
elsewhere Cox argues, again, as John Dunn summarizes, that Locke’s theory of 
international relations is best characterized by “the endless quest for the maximization of 
the wealth and power of the state in order best to secure the preservation of the 
individual.”187  
Others not directly affiliated with Strauss have also put forward the Lockean-
mercantilist view of international politics, such as C.B. Macpherson.188 Macpherson’s 
position holds that states are extreme individualists which, like their human counterparts, 
not only have no real duties to others but are also “‘infinite appropriators’ in the sense 
that there are no significant limitations on their capacities to acquire land and capital at 
the expense of others.”189 Needless to say, this has been a powerful interpretive tradition 
that spans a greater part of the twentieth century. Even the residual effects of this 
influence can be seen in the more recent constructivist arguments in American IR theory. 
For instance, Alexander Wendt, in his landmark work Social Theory of International 
Politics, elaborates on what he calls “the Lockean culture of anarchy” which he argues is 
characterized by rivalry among equal sovereigns. For Wendt, this so-called Lockean 
anarchic culture differs only marginally from the Hobbesian culture of enmity, and 
represents what he hopes will be a transitional phase toward the Kantian culture of 
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friendship.190  
One might also lump in this broad interpretive approach a tendency to see Locke 
as an advocate not only of robust interventionism, but also of wars of retribution, 
unchecked colonial expansion, and the ruthless dispossession of Native American 
holdings. Leo Strauss argues that one could justify international retribution on a Lockean 
account in light of the improper or wasteful (mis)use of property: “The terrors of the 
natural law no longer strike the covetous, but the waster. The natural law regarding 
property is concerned with the prevention of waste.”191 Richard Tuck summarizes 
Locke’s thought this way:  
We find in the Second Treatise a political theory which vindicates a private right 
to punishment against people or nations which break the law of nature; which 
allows arbitrary power of life and death to the masters of slaves taken in war; and 
which allows settlers to occupy the lands of native peoples without consulting 
their wishes in any way.192  
 
Tuck characterizes Locke as simply recapitulating the worst elements of the Spanish 
moralist tradition (Molina, Vitoria) with regard to England’s colonial practices in North 
American—namely that a theory of punishment (of those who violate the natural law) is 
at the heart of the text. And finally, Barbara Arneil argues that Locke’s Two Treatises 
“were written as a defence of England’s colonial policy in the new world,” in particular 
they were “written to justify the seventeenth-century dispossession of the aboriginal 
peoples of their land, through a vigorous defence of England’s ‘superior’ claims to 
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proprietorship.”193  
As indicated above, readings within this tradition are responsible for 
characterizing Locke as a footnote to Hobbes when it comes to international relations. I 
do not mean to imply, however, that such readings are entirely baseless. To be sure, their 
longstanding appeal stems from their very plausibility. John Dunn makes this point in an 
offhanded way in his critique of Richard Cox: 
it is clearly correct to say that their [states’] purpose is partly to protect their 
inhabitants against external attack and that they are more likely to be successful in 
this assignment if they are militarily strong. But from this it does not follow that 
their only or predominant purpose is to provide such protection and their 
dominant duty to maximize their military strength, nor that whatever maximizes 
their military strength is obligatory for them nor that whatever is obligatory for 
them for this reason is obligatory for them for this reason alone.194 
 
As a descriptive point, some (even many) states do and certainly will threaten one 
another in the pursuit of increased security and wealth. The history of the international 
order that Locke provides speaks to this fact. He writes that human political development 
sees individuals breaking away from their communities of birth “setting up new 
governments in other places; from whence sprang all that number of petty common-
wealths in the beginning of ages, and which always multiplied, as long as there was room 
enough, till the stronger, or more fortunate, swallowed the weaker, and those great ones 
again breaking to pieces, dissolved into lesser dominions” (ST: §115). Stronger states 
may, in practice, swallow weaker ones. However, as Dunn rightly indicates, the fact that 
seventeenth-century European powers aggressively pursued wealth and power this way 
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does not necessarily imply normative approval, much less an obligation to do so. 
To be sure, some of the global insecurity that underwrites and indeed animates the 
Straussian reading of Locke can be mitigated by the presence of certain obligations and 
duties that states have to each other. What these duties are, of course, is open to debate, 
but a strong case can be made that promise-keeping is one such obligation. As Dunn 
explains, “promises in Locke’s scheme are not intrinsically human social devices—they 
are the elementary human moral bonds and, once they have been made, their 
obligatoriness is almost a logical truth—so much so that they even bind the Almighty.”195 
This implies that not only are trust and promise-keeping at the root of all political society 
(political society is not possible without a belief that people will keep their promises); 
they also seem to be a basic component of international society as well.196 After all, 
peppered throughout Locke’s voluminous writings are references to “leagues,” 
“alliances,” “compacts,” “bargains,” “covenants,” “oaths,” and “promises” between 
governors of independent communities. In §14 of the Second Treatise, Locke speaks of 
“promises and bargains for truck,” and in §45, Locke explains that “positive agreement” 
“between several states and kingdoms” had been reached with regard to land rights; states 
gave up “all claim and right to the land in the others possession” based on the belief in a 
common natural right. States expressly or tacitly gave up on any pretense of potential 
ownership of “distant parts and parcels of the earth” based on who devoted “labour and 
                                                 
195 Ibid., p. 162. Locke makes this claim in §6 of the First Treatise and §195 of the Second Treatise: 
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industry” to those parts and parcels. They agreed that use and cultivation justifies 
ownership. This passage does not seem to suggest competition, tension, or conflict, but 
rather concession and voluntary agreement. 
The Liberal-Legalist Tradition: 
 The Locke of the first, and one might say dominant, interpretive approach stands 
in rather stark contrast to that of the liberal-legalist tradition. As indicated above, the 
liberal-legalist interpretive tradition sees duty to the natural law as the rudimentary basis 
for international law, that is, at least inasmuch as promise-keeping is a duty rooted in the 
natural law. International order begins to emerge when nations demonstrate a willingness 
to comply with these duties and obligations. As Lee Ward argues, “For Locke, uncovering 
the moral basis of international relations was inseparable from the central theoretical 
imperatives of his political philosophy.”197 And since the law of nature is not rooted in 
self-interest, one should expect some kind of international order to emerge; Locke 
rhetorically asks:  
If … men (as they say) are placed by the law of nature into a state of war; all 
society is destroyed, and all trust, which is the bond of society. What reason is left 
for the fulfillment of promises, what protection for the interests of society, what 
sense of community and common purpose between men, when equity and justice 
are the same as self-interest? What can social life amongst men consist in, if not 
fraud, violence, hatred, robbery, murder, and so forth, when every man not only is 
allowed, but is obliged to grab what he can, by any means, from his neighbor, for 
his neighbor, for his part, is obliged to hang on to it at all costs?198  
 
 David Armitage points to John Rawls’ early belief (which he apparently 
abandoned by the time he published The Law of Nations) that “Locke… provides the 
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firmest foundations for an international law open to all states willing to abide by it.”199 
According to this way of thinking, international laws are binding only to the degree to 
which states find them reasonable and are willing to yield to the moral principles in play. 
Agreements of this nature seem likely since only some in the state of nature are corrupt, 
vicious, and degenerate men who threaten the security of the whole.200 Michael Doyle 
and Geoffrey Carlson have subsequently argued that Locke was even less sanguine about 
the role international institutions will play in restraining the behavior of states. They 
argue that even though Locke “offers the most complete—indeed modern—
understanding of compliance with international law in general” they conclude that 
“Lockean international law… is not a fully reliable political framework for order” 
because “unlike Kant, Locke sees international peace as troubled; without authoritative 
international institutions (courts, etc.) rivalries can escalate into war.”201 It is no 
coincidence, then, they explain, that Locke “introduces more occasions for the just use of 
force.”202 
This interpretive scheme, which prioritizes voluntary compliance to a morally-
binding natural law, has emerged rather haltingly in IR literature. Indeed, Locke’s 
contribution to global politics has been in some sense overshadowed by the English 
School of IR theory, which tended to favor the Grotian conception of international society 
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to that of Hobbes and Kant. Headly Bull indicates only in passing that “Locke’s 
conception of the state of nature as a society without government does in fact provide us 
with a close analogy with the society of states.”203 In fact, one of the criticisms leveled 
against Alexander Wendt’s attempt to infuse Locke back into international relations 
discourse, indicated above, is that his Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian categories of 
anarchy do not do as much work as those put forth by Martin Wight—namely the 
Machiavellian, Grotian, and Kantian anarchic structures.204 Hidemi Suganami, for 
instance, argues that “Wendt’s Lockean and Kantian categories are subtypes of Wight’s 
Grotian category, and Wight’s Kantian category does not find a counterpart in Wendt’s 
scheme.”205  
In other words, in the same way the modernist-realists tend to see Locke as a 
footnote to Hobbes, liberals tend to assume that Locke’s understanding of international 
relations theory was a simple recapitulation of the Grotian international legal structure; 
and furthermore, Locke appropriates Grotius in a less systematic or rigorous way. 
Collapsing Locke’s contribution to international thought into that of Grotius’s, however, 
has struck some as too reductive. Richard Tuck, for instance, argues that while “much of 
the Second Treatise can be read as a defence of Grotius’s conclusions against the attacks 
leveled at them by Pufendorf,” this reading hinges on whether or not “Locke’s conception 
of human sociability [was] the narrow conception of Grotius, in which men did not harm 
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one another, but did not provide each other with positive assistance, or was its [sic] 
Pufendorf’s wider conception, in which human beings offered each other mutual aid.”206 
While Tuck believes Locke is closer to Pufendorf on this point, he is uncertain to what 
extent states have a moral obligation to come to each other’s aid.  
The problem Tuck is pointing to is crucial to the liberal-legalist interpretation of 
Locke’s thought; it hints at a set of obligations that may not be, strictly speaking, 
normatively binding for everyone but that nevertheless characterizes the way in which 
nations relate to one another. Or, perhaps it is better to say that, for Locke, there exists a 
class of obligations that are normatively binding but cannot be legislated or enforced 
externally; one must be persuaded or convinced of their merits internally. The difficulty 
with these types of rules that represent normative standards for specific communities of 
voluntary adherents is that it is not immediately clear how they inform or relate to 
international law. Presumably, these private devotional requirements are regarded as 
normatively binding by those who find them compelling; but they cannot be externally 
enforced in part due to the epistemological difficulty of ascertaining the natural law with 
absolute certainty, and also because Locke believes individuals bear certain duties of 
conscience. So despite what it may look like when Locke says that “every man hath a 
right to punish the offender and be executioner of the law of nature” (ST: §8), he is 
clearly not advocating the domestic or international enforcement of moral virtues, like 
charity and civility; but of course it would be a mistake to say that these internal, self-
regulating principles are irrelevant to international affairs. In the end, Locke appears to be 
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less interventionist-minded than one might initially suspect, even when it comes to the 
deeply contested aspects of the law of nature. He refutes the claim that sovereigns were to 
be “nursing fathers to the church”207; furthermore, “who in these countries [Turkey, 
Persia, and China] must be judge of the true religion? But I will ask, whether you or any 
wise man would have put a right of using force into a mahommedan or pagan prince’s 
hand, for the promoting of Christianity?”208  
To understand what this dual set of normative obligations might look like on the 
international scene—i.e. a maximalist set that one’s particular value community holds, 
and a minimalist set that can be required of all communities—we need only return once 
again to the domestic analogy, where Locke speaks of the respective roles of religious 
communities and the magistrate. This is, of course, not a perfect analogy, but it offers us a 
compelling image of how international societies come into existence within the state of 
nature without a common judge. To begin with, Locke makes the distinction between 
civil interests, which are the domain of the magistrate, and spiritual interests, which are 
the domain of churches. The magistrate’s mandate is to preserve the “life, liberty… and 
the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the 
like.”209 To this end, the magistrate has the authority “to give laws, receive obedience, 
and compel with the sword.”210 He does not have the authority to enforce maximal 
normative commitments, such as outward expressions of piety, charity, and worship. It is 
important to point out, however, that it is not the fear of earthly penalties that are the 
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principal stabilizing force within society. The magistrate is not imposing liberties from 
without onto a recalcitrant public; he is protecting a minimalist set of liberties that 
emerge from the community he governs. Locke explains, “penalties are no ways capable 
to produce such belief. It is only light and evidence that can work a change in men’s 
opinions.”211 After all, reasonable men realize that liberty is not license. 
A church or spiritual community, in contrast, is a “voluntary society of men, 
joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshiping of God, 
in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their 
souls.”212 These groups are governed by what Locke calls “good will,” which means that 
“every man has commission to admonish, exhort, convince, another of error, and by 
reasoning draw him into truth.”213 Locke summarizes this point early in the same letter: 
“The business of true religion… is not instituted in order to the erection of an external 
pomp… but to the regulating of men’s lives according to the rules of virtue and piety.”214 
The normative force generated by these religious communities points to a powerful 
binding and, indeed, regulating agent within civil society. What I think this shows is that 
even though these voluntaristic sub-communities within civil society do not have the 
authority to compel individuals by physical force to adhere to maximalist normative 
commitments, it would be a mistake to suggest they are altogether powerless. 
Besides the decorum and civility one would expect from a citizenry religiously 
                                                 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid., p. 396. It is interesting to speculate whether Locke believes religious groups can exist in the state 
of nature prior to the formation of civil society. After all, Locke speaks of “other promises and compacts, 
men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature” (ST:§14).  
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid., p. 390. My emphasis. 
  80   
 
bound to some conception of virtue and piety, these religious communities are stabilizing 
for Locke in another crucial way. This can be seen in the way Locke excludes certain 
individuals within society from civil protection. He writes, “Lastly, those are not at all to 
be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the 
bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, 
though but even in thought, dissolves all.”215 In other words, without some anchoring and 
orienting belief in God, no social commitment is possible; at the very least, without the 
fear of eternal rewards and punishments, without a sense of duty to God’s natural law, 
there is nothing to regulate man’s behavior. And in such a case, the magistrate’s laws 
would be impossible to enforce. Civil society works because there are enough men not 
like those Locke describes in the Second Treatise, i.e. those men “not under the ties of the 
common-law of reason, [who] have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so 
may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure 
to destroy him whenever he falls in their power” (ST: §16).  
 What I believe this domestic analogy shows is that a community’s “civil interests” 
are absolutely contingent on the concerted force of all its sub-communities’ maximalist 
normative commitments, not the other way around. This is to say that it is not the force of 
civil law and the fear of physical punishment that generates social coherence and 
integrity; this is more fundamentally the work of internal regulating principles as well as 
the interpersonal ties of friendship and trust that emerge when members of a group adhere 
to these principles. Liberal-legalists argue that these internal regulating principles that 
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lead states into formal cooperative international agreements.  
 I point this out to show that the Lockean legalist tradition really implies two 
interrelated sets of arguments that explain how international society begins to emerge, 
i.e., how states begin to cooperate and subsequently formalize this interdependence 
through international laws. This view has been expressed, in part, by Lee Ward who 
argues that Locke’s thought straddles the “pluralist” and “solidarist” models of 
international society. The pluralists “derive normative content of international society 
primarily from the mutual recognition of the component societal units’ right to exist and 
promote their diverse national ends with minimal outside interference.”216 In contrast, the 
solidarist model “maintains that human solidarity assumes moral priority to state 
sovereignty since distinct national communities can reach broad agreement about 
substantive moral standards.”217  
To expand on Ward’s taxonomy a bit more, one might say that the first approach 
sees international law stemming from certain obligations states have to the natural law, 
which remain binding as we progress out of the state of nature into civil society, and then 
into a community of nations. Richard Ashcraft, for instance, argues that  
Locke is, after all, offering a developmental picture of the state of nature, its 
transition from one stage to another, where both stages precede the institution of 
political society. It is a mistake to believe that the moral features characteristic of 
the first stage simply disappear with the invention of money and other historical 
developments that characterize the second stage of the state of nature.218  
 
The list of duties regulating international behavior are, of course, contestable given the 
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epistemic difficulties Locke believes characterizes natural law theorizing, but he does 
proscribe wars of conquest and plunder; nations may have a responsibility to assist 
political communities being oppressed by a despot219; nations clearly have a duty to 
defend against foreign threats; and, as mentioned above, princes who make promises to 
other states are obligated to keep them.  
The second approach sees cooperation stemming not exclusively from the 
rational-deliberative adherence to the natural law, but also from less formally binding 
components of human sociability. These are in part determined by the inner regulating 
principles (reasonableness) that bind likeminded Christians, but also, perhaps more 
fundamentally, “courtesy and friendship” create the conditions in which these regulative 
principles are discovered.220 For Locke, maximalist value communities emerge in 
conjunction with human sociability and solidarity. This may not seem obvious at first 
since Locke appears to refute the “judicious Hooker” who argues that “we are naturally 
induced to seek communion and fellowship with others: this was the cause of men’s 
uniting themselves at first in political societies” (ST: §15). What Locke is critiquing here, 
however, is the fact that unlike what Hooker says, a political society, properly speaking, 
does not emerge until “by their own consents they make themselves members of some 
politic society” (ST: §§15, 106). The point here is that sociability and solidarity alone 
cannot make political society, not that there is no socializing force in play. Later on in the 
Second Treatise, when Locke considers why monarchies became the first form of 
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government, this Hookerian sociability is exactly what precipitates the shift into civil 
society. Locke writes,  
Since then those, who like one another so well as to join into society, cannot but 
be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together, and some trust 
one in another; they could not but have greater apprehensions of others, 
than of one another: and therefore their first care and thought cannot but be 
supposed to be, how to secure themselves against foreign force. (ST: §107) 
 
Locke had expressed a similar idea in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding: 
“God having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an 
inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but 
furnished him also with language, which was to be the greatest instrument and common 
tie of society.”221 Enjoying society and making friends, which includes the pro-social 
behavior of trusting and binding oneself to fellow humans is not only expected but 
integral to the transition out of the state of nature; and as indicated above, Locke rejected 
any conception of the natural law that makes friendship a moral liability. 
 These are themes that were picked up by several thinkers immediately following 
Locke. Christian Wolff (1679-1754) “listed mutual love, consideration for the happiness 
of others, charity, contributing to the preservation and perfection of others, contributing 
to barbarous and uncultivated nations, friendship, forbidding injury and the obligation to 
engage in commerce along the most prominent rights and duties owed to nations.”222 
Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) also argues that in order for states to mutually discharge their 
duties, like that of international charity and contributing to the perfection of other states, 
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they must love each other.223 He writes, “This is the pure source from which the offices of 
humanity should proceed; they will retain the character and perfection of it. Then nations 
will be seen sincerely and cheerfully to help each other, earnestly to promote their 
common welfare, and cultivate peace without jealousy or distrust.”224 Furthermore, each 
state is “obliged to cultivate the friendship of other nations, and carefully to avoid 
whatever might kindle their enmity against her.”225 In much the same way, Locke argues 
that even though trusting and making friends are not, strictly speaking, normative 
requirements, the impulse to enter society nevertheless has been implanted in us by God. 
In this light, Hooker’s and Locke’s socializing impulse represents a powerful—but 
obviously limited—organizational element between individuals and, for that matter, 
nations in the state of nature.  
The character of international society, therefore, might actually be the reverse of 
Lee Ward’s image; Ward writes, “The social character of the international state of nature 
derives in part from the capacity of these public persons to generate moral claims and 
obligations.”226 It may be that the moral character of the international state of nature 
derives more basically from public persons’ social obligations to one another. This is to 
say that at the very least, friendship and solidarity minimize the inconveniences of the 
state of nature which allow individuals to be taught by reason, i.e. to discover the natural 
law (ST: §6). In other words, obligations and responsibilities derive from positive 
interpersonal and social ties in the context of trust-based communities.  
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Security Communities 
Thinking of states as members of value-communities engaged in reciprocal 
promise-keeping suggests an approach to international society that reflects (to a certain 
extent) the kind of dynamics one would expect among peers and friends. This approach 
does not naively assume that all nations can or even will develop such relationships; it 
simply assumes that it would be a mistake to believe that such relationships are unlikely 
or impossible in the international arena. This approach assumes that heads of state are 
imbued with a similar set of socializing tendencies and cultural or familial ties that 
precipitate the shift from a position of insecurity and uncertainty to a much more 
contractual or regulated arrangement. Of course, family ties and common culture do not 
guarantee the emergence of security communities in every case, but as Hollis and Smith 
explain, since Locke “presumes that even in a state of nature we are naturally inclined to 
fellowship and communion…”227 it is no stretch to see the emergence of international 
legal structures as possible or even inevitable in spite of the anarchic condition between 
states.228 
What is so compelling about this reading is that it anticipates much of what was 
written about security communities in the middle part of the twentieth century. Karl 
Deutsch identifies two types of security communities: “Amalgamated” and “pluralistic.” 
Amalgamated communities emerge when erstwhile independent political communities 
unify to form one political body, with a federal or central government. The federation of 
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the Thirteen Colonies, where the independent states conferred federal powers to a central 
government, is an obvious example of this. The Union of England and Scotland Act of 
1603 is another. Of course, amalgamated communities are not guaranteed to last; it is 
quite easy to imagine an alternative history in which the American Union and the Union 
of England and Scotland came apart. “Pluralistic communities” are less politically 
ambitious than amalgamated ones; quite simply, states retain their own sovereign 
domestic governments.229 Such communities are almost too common to comprehensively 
list (e.g. NATO, EU, etc). In any case, what underwrites the success of pluralistic 
communities is a growing sense of solidarity, which is animated by  
mutual sympathy and loyalties; of ‘we feelings,’ trust and mutual consideration; 
of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually 
successful predictions of behavior… in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic 
process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and 
responsiveness in the process of decision making.230 
 
While largely neglected during the Cold War, Adler and Barnett rehabilitated the 
security community research program by focusing on the pluralistic taxonomy; they 
expanded it to include three additional levels of organization: nascent, ascendant, and 
mature security communities, which they view as heuristic categories that retroactively 
describe the “institutionalization of dependable expectations of peaceful change.”231 
According to Adler’s and Barnett’s hypothetical construction, international partnerships 
originated as nascent communities, where “governments do not explicitly seek to create a 
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security community. Instead they begin to consider how they might coordinate their 
relations in order to: increase their mutual security; lower the transactions costs 
associated with their exchanges; and/or encourage further exchanges and interactions.”232 
Increasingly dense networks begin to emerge—in the form of institutions and 
organizations—which facilitate the transition from nascent to ascendant communities. 
After a sufficient period of formal organization and mutual interdependence, a mature 
community emerges, which is characterized by mutual trust; “At this point, regional 
actors share an identity and, therefore, entertain dependable expectations of peaceful 
change and a security community now comes into existence.”233  
It is compelling the degree to which Locke’s conception of politics and the 
formation of civil societies maps over this security community discourse. To a certain 
extent, one might say that all political societies are amalgamated societies—from small-
scale political communities to transnational empires. Locke is quite clear that the “first 
care and thought [of a political society] cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure 
themselves against foreign force” (ST: §107). Internally, private judgments and the 
private right to enforce the laws of nature have been suspended and problems are 
adjudicated by an impartial umpire. Locke explains, “Those who are united into one 
body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to 
decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society on with 
another” (ST: §87).  
A plausible example of an amalgamated society in Locke’s day is the British 
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Empire—from the unification of the British Isles to its colonial holdings across the globe. 
As a perhaps overzealous editor wrote in the Preface to the 1766 edition of Locke’s 
“Observations upon the Growth and Culture of Vines and Olives”:  
The most perfect harmony will subsist between Great Britain and her colonies, as 
long as British subjects, cemented by blood, by mutual interest and commerce, 
continue friends to liberty and the protestant religion, and succession in the 
present royal family; this is a true and lasting family-compact: all which 
inestimable blessings will be rendered permanent and inviolable by the fleets of 
England, which, whilst the British empire is united, will be superiour to all other 
powers in the world.234  
 
David Armitage points out that Locke never uses the word “empire” to describe the 
relationship between Britain and her colonies; in fact, he argues that  
the label imperial cannot be aptly applied to Locke because he did not espouse or 
elaborate a hierarchical ordering of populations, least of all one that placed 
Europeans above or even apart from other groups, because he saw rationality 
itself as evenly distributed among human populations and the usual markings of 
civilisation as contingent and fragile.235  
 
This raises an interesting question as to what kind of political society Locke understood 
Great Britain and her colonies to be engaged in. Julian Franklin makes a convincing case 
that Locke was deeply influenced by George Lawson’s conception of sovereignty, 
outlined in Politica sacra et civilis (pub. 1660), which sees sovereignty devolving from 
the government to civil society. If this is true, the colonial “empire” looks more like a 
proper amalgamated community—i.e. more or less “sovereign” political communities 
assenting to a central executive.236 This Lawsonian conception of sovereignty can 
perhaps be seen in the way Locke’s writings were used by his close friend, William 
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Molyneux, to argue that the Protestant Irish had the right to self-government, in his The 
Case of Ireland (1689), due to the fact that the political trust with England had been 
violated.237 A similar conception of sovereignty was employed by Locke during the 
Glorious Revolution.238  
 Adler’s and Barnett’s taxonomy of nascent, ascendant, and mature pluralistic 
communities makes it somewhat easier to reconcile Locke’s description of seventeenth 
century global politics with the potential embedded in his own thought. Even though 
Locke spends less time speaking about the agreements between nations, he does mention 
them. Locke designates the management of foreign policy to what he calls the “federative 
powers” of the state, which include “the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, 
and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without the commonwealth” 
(ST: §146). He goes on to explain that part of the difficulty states face in the execution of 
their federative powers is that unlike executive power (which concerns law enforcement 
within the state), “it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive 
laws than the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of 
those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good” (ST: §147, my emphasis). 
This management is left to the prudence and prerogative of those who oversee the state’s 
foreign policy since “what is to be done in reference to foreigners, [depends] much upon 
their actions, and the variation of designs and interests” (ST: §147).  
The italicized passage above, which deals with the force of “antecedent, standing, 
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positive laws,” can be taken in two ways. First, “much less capable” may imply “almost 
entirely incapable,” which would, of course, mean that the international arena cannot be 
regulated by positive law at all.239 And since states cannot be governed by antecedent, 
standing positive law, a prudent foreign policy expert should manage a country’s foreign 
affairs in terms of national interest—i.e. ensuring the state’s self-preservation by 
enhancing its material wealth and military capability. The trouble with this reading is that 
“much less capable” is quite obviously not the same as “incapable.” According to this 
second formulation, positive law has some regulating potential, but it is not entirely clear 
how much. In this second reading, Locke may be pointing to the descriptive fact that it is 
simply harder to establish positive law among all nations since “what is to be done in 
reference to foreigners … [depends] much upon their actions.” In other words, it depends 
on whether such reciprocal agreements can be reached on a state-by-state basis. Of 
course, given the number of positive agreements he points to throughout his work, Locke 
clearly does not believe it is impossible to reach such agreements. It certainly makes 
sense that states operating in good faith, according to the laws of nature, can and likely 
will be governed by such positive agreements.  
 Furthermore, what is so unusual about the federative power is that even though 
Locke is ostensibly ambivalent about what it is called—he writes “So the thing be 
understood, I am indifferent as to the name” (ST: § 146)—he nevertheless chooses to 
identify it with the Latin etymology that signifies “covenant” or “league.” Locke could 
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have, like Grotius, simply bundled this federative power into his conception of 
“sovereign power.”240 He could have, like Hobbes, called it “the Power of Warre and 
Peace,”241 but instead he chose this highly suggestive neologism. Given his ambivalence, 
one must be careful not to place too much emphasis on the term he uses; but perhaps this 
formulation in some small way is suggestive of both his conception of what diplomatic 
prudence entails and the kind of international arena Locke envisioned. This is a vision of 
international politics where one would expect nations to “federate” by way of covenants 
and leagues on the basis of their trustworthiness. At the very least, this seems to speak 
against the Lockean readings which see states as atomistic and egoistic “infinite 
appropriators” which sit in unrestricted rivalry with every other state. The law of nature 
includes, it does not reduce to, self-preservation (ST: §6). 
 There is at least one example in Locke’s political career as a confidant and advisor 
to Lord Shaftesbury that speaks to the plausibility of this argument. In February of 1673, 
not long after Lord Shaftesbury was promoted to the position of Lord Chancellor, he was 
called upon to defend to Parliament the Declaration of Indulgence and, in particular, what 
we now call the Third Anglo-Dutch War. In his speech, which Locke very likely had a 
hand in drafting, Shaftesbury argued that the States General were “‘the common enemies 
to all monarchies,’ dangerous neighbors to all crowned heads. As our only competitor for 
trade and naval power their ambition threatened the establishment of a ‘universal empire 
as great as Rome’; even now they were so intoxicated with ambition that they would not 
make peace”; and Shaftesbury goes on to conclude: “if, after this, you suffer them to get 
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up, let this be remembered, the States of Holland are England’s eternal enemy, both by 
interest and inclination.”242 In other words, Shaftesbury employs what can be 
characterized as a conventional balance of power argument—France and England needed 
to balance against the hegemonic ascendency of Dutch commercial power. What 
Shaftesbury did not know was that what lay behind these policies was the Treaty of 
Dover (1670), which King Charles II secretly made with Louis XIV. The conspiratorial 
nature of the treaty can be summed up in one crucial perambulatory phrase: “Being 
convinced of the truth of the Roman Catholic Religion…”243 It subsequently became 
known that the war against Holland was driven by this clandestine Catholic agenda. 
Subsequently, Shaftesbury—and Parliament in general—withdrew support for these 
policies; the Declaration of Indulgence was countered by the Test Act (1673), which 
excluded all Catholics from government offices, and the Treaty of Westminster (1674) 
abruptly took England out of the war with the Dutch.244 It is compelling that Dutch 
religious affiliation would override conventional balancing logic. After all, despite the 
religious conspiracy, Holland still remained England’s chief trade competitor and naval 
rival.245 It should not have mattered what the religious affiliation of the states were. It is 
on this point, that we have a glimpse of Locke’s thinking—namely, why Locke would 
pivot to support Protestant Holland over Catholic France—which can be found in his 
1667 draft of “An Essay Concerning Toleration”; he writes: 
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For the interest of the king of England as head of the Protestants will be much 
improved by the discountenancing of popery amongst us. The differing parties 
will soon unite in a common friendship with us when they find we really separate 
from and set ourselves against the common enemy, both to our Church and all 
Protestant professions, and this will be an hostage of our friendship to them, and a 
security that they shall not be deceived in the confidence they have of us and the 
sincerity of the accord we make with them.246 
 
What this passage suggests is that Locke envisions something like a Protestant security 
community to protect against a “common enemy”—the Catholic Church. While Locke’s 
Catholic antipathy became slightly more muted over time, this offers us a good picture of 
the value-solidarity that informed Locke’s notion of international security.  
 The emergence of communities of trust rooted in ties of kinship and common 
values does not immediately clarify whether or not, as Alex Bellamy asks, “the 
proliferation of security communities foster integrative transnational relations between 
insiders and outsiders or create regional fortresses preparing for the kind of civilisational 
conflict envisioned by Samuel Huntington.”247 Based on the quotes from the Letters on 
Toleration indicated above, one could envision a Lockean world divided among pagan, 
Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant value communities, where communities of trust emerge 
first and foremost among those with the same religious sympathies (such as between 
North American colonies and the England). And the Christian communities stand in 
fortified opposition “to the pagan, mahometan, and erroneous princes in the world” 
because there are so many of them (and they might be tempted to impose and enforce 
their own conception of moral truth on the rest of humankind).   
While it is perhaps true that in Locke’s time the most likely place to find nascent 
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security communities is between communities with common values (i.e. among 
Protestants), he also points to the possibility of commercial agreements that bridge the 
gap between pagan and Christian, such as “the promises and bargains for truck etc. 
between … a Swiss and an Indian in the woods of America” (ST, §14). In the same 
section Locke goes on to explain that these agreements “are binding to them, though they 
are perfectly in the state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth and keeping of 
faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society.” As Dunn indicates, trust 
“depends on many different sorts of considerations: on the contingencies of individual 
disposition, of the prevailing culture of a particular community and the practical 
structures of material interests which are at issue.”248 While it may be difficult to pinpoint 
the exact conditions under which trust is given in every case, it is clear that common 
commercial values, also based on habits of trust and trustworthiness, speak to the 
potential of political communities to be, at the very least, economic integrators. Even 
though, as Adler and Barnett suggest, common interests that are as minimal as a desire to 
reduce transaction costs may lead to communities of economic interdependence, on some 
level these must be underwritten by a more basic socializing impulse, which includes a 
posture of friendliness, nonaggression, and trustworthiness.249 
 There is perhaps one more observation to make on the relationship between 
collective security, common good, and commerce for Locke. In his own descriptions of 
global politics, he distinguishes the seventeenth-century as unlike its Roman 
                                                 
248 Dunn, “The concept of ‘trust’ in the politics of John Locke,” p. 290. 
249 See also, Andrej Tusicisny, “Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously,” 
International Political Science Review 28:4 (2007). pp. 425-449. 
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predecessors:  
In a country not furnished with mines, there are but two ways of growing rich, 
either conquest or commerce. By the first the Romans made themselves master of 
the riches of the world; but I think that, in our present circumstances, nobody is 
vain enough to entertain a thought of our reaping the profits of the world with our 
swords, and making the soil and tribute of vanquished nations the fund for the 
supply of the charges of the government, with an overplus for the wants, and 
equally-craving luxury, and fashionable vanity of the people.250  
 
At first glance, this sentiment may seem laughable when one actually looks at European 
colonial policies of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries; many nations were vain 
enough to reap the profits of the world with swords.251 It is clear in Locke’s writing, 
however, that the acquisition of property by way of conquest was not permitted; this was 
his second “strange doctrine” propounded in the Second Treatise (ST: §180). In this 
sense, Locke’s “inaccurate” description of global politics is less important than his 
normative belief that such behavior was animated by vanity and an empty sense of 
superiority. This is, in part, why it is difficult to reconcile the view of the state as an 
“infinite appropriator” with Locke’s belief that we bear the collective responsibility to 
improve the “common stock of mankind” (ST: §37). And the best way to do this is by 
way of political communities which are grounded on the principles of individual labor 
and private property.  
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to show that embedded within Locke’s political thought 
                                                 
250 John Locke, “Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the 
Value of Money,” The Works of John Locke, Vol. 4 (London, 1824). p. 13. 
251 This may, in fact, be a satirical dig at the French. Locke repeatedly referred to French vanity in his 
letters. See Woolhouse, Locke: A Biography, p. 111. After all, Louis XIV was “a warrior king,” who saw 
war “as an essential instrument both for preserving his existing patrimony and adding on to what he would 
bequeath to his heirs” (Darryl Dee, Expansion and Crisis in Louis XIV’s France: Franche-Comte and 
Absolute Monarchy, 1674-1715 [Rochester: University Rochester Press, 2009]. p. 3). 
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is an overlooked understanding of human sociability which underwrites and indeed 
makes possible political and international society. While one is, of course, not obligated 
to make friends, the fact that humans tend to pursue such connections helps to mitigate 
some of the risk and uncertainty that comes with voluntary compliance to perceived 
duties in the international arena. Friendship and trust precipitate contractual arrangements 
which serve not only to minimize the inconveniences of the state of nature but also lead 
to ever increasing levels of interconnectedness.252 Despite the less-than-ideal geo-
political conditions Locke was writing in, his vision of global politics anticipates and, 
indeed, expects that international communities will emerge that exercise restraint by way 
of reciprocal agreements based on voluntary compliance to international law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
252 Contrast this view with Robert Axelrod which takes certain Hobbesian assumptions of the state of nature 
as representative. Robert Axelrod, “The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists,” The American 
Political Science Review 75:2 (June, 1981). pp. 306-318. 
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